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THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION AND ANTHRO- POLOGY¹

BY CLARK WISSLER, PH. D.,

*Curator in Anthropology, American Museum of Natural History, New York
City*

There is an old saying that one is judged by the company he keeps. At various times, so it seems to me, anthropology has made a special effort to run in biological company and has been judged accordingly. Quite naturally biologists have asked of the stranger in their midst how she stood upon the fundamentals of their faith. So far they have not received what they consider a satisfactory answer. Since the biological sciences have to a considerable extent determined the thoughts of every individual, made over his social views and even his religion, it is time that anthropologists seriously consider where they stand with respect to the fundamentals in biological faith. We are quite familiar with the assertion that Darwinism was the creator of all the present-day sciences. Since by Darwinism is usually meant the doctrine of evolution, and since anthropology itself is often said to depend upon such a doctrine for its very existence, it becomes worth our while to examine the achievements of anthropology with respect to that doctrine.

So far as I am aware, no present-day anthropologist denies that the phenomenon of anthropology evolves: *i. e.*, that peoples come and go; that cultures are not fixed absolutely but are found disintegrating on the one hand and taking on new elements and forms on the other. Such are obvious even to the amateur. At the same time, however, the general reader may be shocked to find

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violent attacks upon the evolutionary method in anthropology. In America one or two anthropologists have decried even the use of the word evolution. In Europe Professor Graebner, Father Schmidt, and others have protested against its introduction. So, now it has become the fashion among the younger students, in America at least, to cast stones at the evolutionary view. On the other hand, English anthropologists have been set down by their critics as evolutionists and as arrayed against the rest of the world. Notwithstanding the fact that the late O. T. Mason, one of our most distinguished anthropologists, was in the main a follower of the English school, American anthropologists, as a rule, have lined up in opposition to what they call the evolutionary school.

Now, the chief opponents of the evolutionary school set up what they call the historical method. Though I have yet to hear a clear definition of this point of view, it seems to be, in the main, that the culture of any given group of people is to be interpreted entirely by its history and not otherwise. By the history of cultures shall you know them, is the dogma of that method. Now, I wonder how this strikes the biologist, since Professor Robinson, the historian, claims to have found in the doctrine of evolution the most profound exposition of history; since geology, for example, is chiefly an attempt at the history of the earth; paleontology, of the fauna, etc. Therefore, I am not surprised when some of my biological friends tell me that they cannot get our point of view in setting over the historical as opposed to the evolutionary view of anthropology, since to them both terms call up the same group of ideas. It is strange that some biologist has not taken us to task for having confused our terms, maintaining that the historic view is, after all, the true doctrine of evolution.

For a clearer understanding of the question at issue we must consider the nature of culture, or the chief phenomena of anthropology. The doctrine of evolution is apparently consistent with the nature of biological phenomena; the historical view in anthropology, therefore, should be consistent with the nature of anthropological phenomena.

By culture we mean a certain complex that seems to be produced by individuals and which is not inherited. Thus, from a biological point of view, culture appears as something objective that stands outside of and apart from the individual. It is

generally considered that the instincts, the psychological, physiological, and anatomical characters of the individual are innate or inherited. With these as an equipment the individual comes into the world but does not bring his culture. He is, however, born into the midst of a culture which he proceeds to take on as acquired characteristics. It is not far wrong to say that by culture the anthropologist means the total complex of these acquisitions in life. This applies particularly to our social habit complexes, association habits and thought, which, from a biological or morphological point of view, are the most objective of our acquired characters. For the sake of clearness, then, we may set over on one side the non-inherited characters as culture and on the other the instincts, psychological characters, etc., as the biological equipment. Here we see a rather nice distinction between biological phenomena and anthropological phenomena: the one deals in the main with phenomena of inheritance, or those forms, qualities, or characters transmitted through the germ plasm; while the other deals with phenomena so distinctly among acquired characters that their non-hereditary transmission is rarely questioned. It seems to me that the tendency of anthropology is clearly to seize upon the non-inheritable as its province and leave the other to psychology and the various biological sciences.

Now, I fancy that certain objections may be raised against this view. It will be said that in language, sex-activity, etc., there are inherited factors which cannot be separated from cultural or acquired characters. Let us have a look at language then. No one for a moment contends that French, German, etc., are in-born. In humanity at large there doubtless is an instinct to form a language—a human innate character common to all men. On the other hand, psychologists are clear that we have in any language and any system of writing merely complex habits acquired in life. Thus, we seem to have on one side a mechanism capable of taking on the various habits of speech and writing, together with, we may admit, an instinct to form such habits, all of which is innate. But the blessed thing in it all is that just there the innate ends, leaving us as a mass free to produce and conserve our speech. So far nothing has been brought forward to show that a child cannot and will not master any language he comes in contact with, whether he be by birth Australian, Chinese, Negro, or European. It

is almost useless to speculate as to what perfectly isolated infants would do, but if there is an instinct to speech, it is safe to bet they would set to work developing a language on original lines. We must keep clearly before our minds that there is a difference between inheriting an instinct to form and to acquire *speech* and inheriting an instinct to acquire a *particular* language. Whatever may be the case in the former, the latter is certainly not innate. Turning again to culture in general, we see it as a complex of complicated habits. By social instincts it is itself accumulative and conservative, so that a body of people may from one point of view appear as a great organism itself building up culture. Not a few distinguished anthropologists seem confused by this into stickling for the instinctive factor in culture. There should be no great difficulty in seeing that the individual may be born with a full equipment of instincts to develop and participate in any culture he may happen to be born into. If we conceive of any culture as a game, it follows that he may successfully play the game without innate specific possession of the rôle for a particular game. We all participate in a cultural game and a little social introspection will show that we act upon this principle. Thus, when we say our daughters have aptitudes or instincts for music, we do not sit back and say "Play!" No indeed, we send them to school to acquire the particular musical phase of culture we have developed. The point we are coming at is that there are no specific mechanisms for the production of particular cultures, but a general equipment common in kind, but not necessarily in degree, to all members of the existing species—a wonderful complex instinct to participate in the development of cultures. So far as I can see, the facts of anthropology are consistent with this view. Its significance is that we have the appearance of absolute discontinuity between the evolutionary biological hereditary series and the accumulative cultural series. Here is where we get an inkling of the inner nature of the anthropological view, for I take it that the partisans of the historical method in anthropology set down as evolutionary all views that naïvely step this gap between the biological and the cultural series, bringing over with them their biological methods and categories, and that it is this to which they are opposed. The historical point of view seems to be that, while cultures have been constructed by the functioning of innate, or instinc-

tive factors, it is the results, the records or histories of these activities that make up the chief phenomena of anthropology. The biological doctrine of evolution is, therefore, a theory to account for the presence of man with this biological equipment of culture-producing instincts. All the historical anthropologist asks is to be given creatures with an innate equipment to produce cultures. So far as he is concerned, from that far distant day to this no qualitative changes need have occurred in man to account for the facts of anthropology.

It is on just this point that anthropologists are so often misunderstood and unjustly condemned. Everyone is so accustomed to applying biological concepts to cultural phenomena that such a statement seems to imply the rankest kind of heresy. But let us be clear. We take it that it is generally agreed that in *kind*, though not necessarily in degree, all peoples now living are alike in their biological equipments. Let us therefore pass on to a more remote period. Take the men, who during paleolithic times lived in the cavern of Altamira, that famous prehistoric picture gallery. Once face to face with those drawings we feel sure that few will have the courage to contend that their artists had an equipment different in kind from our own. Likewise the chipping of stone in early periods seems not technically different from that in neolithic times. That a different psycho-physical mechanism was used seems unlikely. In short, nothing in the whole gamut of European archeology gives any sign that we have from the first anything but the products of man's inventive instincts.

It seems from the general literature that the tendency of Darwinism has been to take a view which may be characterized as parallelism. According to this view, it is conceived that man began with a crude nerve morphology, with a crude mind, to use the rudest make believe of tools, and to practice the simplest conceivable culture; but that little by little the complexity of the nervous equipment increased and that hand in hand with that went an upward trend in culture. In short, it is somewhat naïvely assumed that the advance in culture is part and parcel to an advance in morphology. This is quite an egotistical view, since it seems to imply that some conceivably highest state of culture is the end and aim of the whole evolutionary process. It appears, however, that anthropology has not found the facts in entire harmony with this parallel development view.

In the first place, changes in culture are too frequent to be correlated with morphological changes and are also too erratic. Cases may be cited in which individuals formerly savage acquired the elements of modern European culture, whence it is evident that no important morphological changes could have taken place to serve as the basis for this new cultural acquisition. On the other hand, it may be urged that we are here flying in the face of the facts, for do we not know that eugenics is real and that even the animals may be greatly improved by the breed? And can it be shown that man, by the law of survival, has gone on rising toward the goal of the highest conceivable culture by any other means than wavering gains in the kind and quality of his innate equipment? Can it be shown that there is any reason to doubt but that by such variation there has been a more or less steady increase in the efficiency of man's biological equipment? All this may be true, if we are clear as to what we are talking about. Eugenics is a fact. The experience of the world attests it, at least among horses, dogs, etc. By human agencies or otherwise it has come to pass that we have horses of many sizes and colors, fast and slow, strong and frail; but after all, they are horses. Those primitive men of Europe in the long ago, some of whom lived in caves, have left us spirited drawings of the horse, and how little has he changed. From somewhat after that day to this, man has been busy shaping and selecting his horses, but their germ plasm is ultra-conservative. Likewise the dog, and though for untold ages he has been bred, he still has the bark and the wag of the tail. In the germ-plasm of the horse is something that stands for horse nature, that defies elimination, likewise in the dog. Our position is that you can twist this, shape it somewhat, but that is all; that in human germ-plasm is something that stands for human nature, culture production, and this is far and away one of the more conservative and stubborn qualities in the world. It is true that eugenics may account for certain differences in man's cultural capacity, but such are only variations within the type: it cannot reduce men to barking nor equip dogs for culture—at least, the experience of the world is so far against it.

The last word of psychology seems to be that a child is born with a mechanism and an instinct to develop complex habits by imitating those around him. Among whatever people he is

born and grown up, it is their habits he acquires. Everywhere the plain people have recognized that childhood is the period when these habits are formed and have, accordingly, invented schools and many other devices to make more certain the formation of those habits held in most esteem. The common folk also act upon the belief that if the most important of these habits—that is the most important from the cultural horizon of each group—if these are not acquired in early life, they cannot be fully acquired at all. Each of us is familiar with these beliefs. Scientific beliefs are, on the whole, consistent with this popular belief. As anthropologists, we are vitally interested in the problem as to whether a child is born with instincts and mechanisms for the development of any particular set of such habits. Folk belief is here not so definite, but there is a widespread conviction that a white child, for example, is born with an instinct and a special equipment to acquire the habits of European culture. On reflection, I guess that only a few scientists would dissent from this view, if it were put to a vote in the primaries. Yet, people forget that the tenets of the Christian religions, the practices of the church, are all consistent with the view that such are not inborn. So also is the policy of educating the Indian, the Negro, and all other native children. This, however, proves nothing. Yet, while there is no convincing evidence for either side, anthropologists find clues here and there pointing always toward a relative equality of birth. Men in other professions have also noted such clues. In our Indian schools we see an experiment, but one in which there is a conflict between two groups of habits with the odds in favor of Indian culture. On the whole, anthropologists and psychologists are disposed to believe that the failure of the white culture to wholly displace the Indian is not due to innate factors but to the fact that the Indian child has ever so much greater an opportunity to acquire the habits belonging to its parents. It is necessary for the anthropologist to have some working hypothesis and most of us have now assumed that the innate biological equipments of all living races of men are alike in kind. I believe that psychologists also assume the same.

The phrase *alike in kind* should be noted, else we shall be misunderstood. The psychologist, for example, says that all members of the white race, at least, are *alike in kind* but that there are many individual differences as to the degree to which

the various members of that group acquire and function. It is believed that there is a universal instinct to invent and that this especially differs in degree from individual to individual; nevertheless, it is the same *kind* of activity. Now, the working hypothesis of anthropology is that all living peoples have this same kind of inventive activity. Practical people, on the other hand, who grapple with race problems in any form, are concerned with the facts as to the relative degrees among the various groups. I have never met a champion of race inequality, however radical, who would weaken his position in the least by admitting that all men are *alike in kind*. Though I myself firmly believe that the assumption of likeness in kind is sound and consistent with the facts at hand, I am inclined to believe that there are very great differences of degree among the various groups of mankind, especially in the matter of invention. One of the reasons for this is that everywhere anthropological investigation has brought to light ranges of individual differences within the group exactly like those among us, and it seems more probable than not that the averages of the respective groups will vary. I believe that the partisans of race inequality can muster a strong brief for their cases, if they stick to this distinction. As I said before, the answer to this question is not at present vital to anthropology, to the science of government and to sociology it may be otherwise. To anthropology the vital problem is the existence or non-existence of innate equipments for particular cultures. The evidence so far seems decidedly in favor of their non-existence.

Now, it is clear to us that when the anthropologist sets over the historical against the evolutionary conception in his science, he is not for a moment denying that cultures evolve or grow, he is only denying that this growth is an integral part of biological evolution. That cultural phenomena are a part of, parallel to, or continuous with, biological phenomena in the sense we have just considered it, is not accepted by anthropology. The historical method assumes that there is a history of cultural activity for each particular group of mankind and that the culture of any given moment is only to be interpreted by its past. It may be that the choice of the term *historic* is not altogether a happy one and that stripped of its inessentials we have at bottom the cultural conception.

This conception is now taken as the fundamental principle in all lines of anthropological research. Problems in purely physical anthropology are made subordinate to it. Living peoples are grouped according to their cultures and in archeological work the problems are largely the extent, kind, and chronology of culture. In European archeology the chronological aspect has overshadowed everything else, things were found there in such convenient relations that quite naturally the tendency was to treat the data as parts of a pure chronological series. Here is where the extreme evolutionists got their inspiration. On the other hand, the rapid development of work among living races has exercised a corrective wholesome influence, which with the new data in Europe itself is tending more and more to the cultural view: *i. e.*, that the various so-called epochs are, after all, types of culture, quite unevenly distributed, showing decided local variations, and, while in the main their relative chronological relations have been determined for certain localities, there is evidence that some of them were contemporaneous. The cultural conception is clear when we recall that new sites are determined according to the cultural characters and that skeletal remains are placed according to their cultural antecedents rather than by their anatomy. Even the classical cave-epoch is coming to be more and more a mere type of culture not strictly chronological but rather geographical.

I am well aware that those who take the biological point of view object to the dominance of the cultural conception; they even claim that we have stolen the name anthropology which was intended to stand strictly for human biology and applied it to something that is not biology. This we may grant provided our critics will be consistent and not attempt to claim cultural phenomena as within the domain of biology. We all know that a science is determined by the problems it pursues and not by the etymology of its name. One has but to scan the literature of anthropology to see that it has a fundamental problem in the first appearance, distribution and subsequent history of man on the earth. This is precisely what is at the root of the cultural problem. On the other hand, we must not overlook the fact that some problems in science are too fundamental to be claimed by any one science. Among such is the problem of man's first appearance and origin upon the earth.

Most certainly the geologist, the biologist, the anatomist, and the psychologist have a great deal to do with this problem. One need but look into the special literature of European archeology to see that man's antiquity is essentially a complex of geological and faunistic problems—problems for whose solution the anthropologists have no equipment whatever. When we turn to the anthropological side of the problem we find the chief approach through the evidence of man's earliest culture and the sequence of the subsequent cultures. So from first to last we find anthropology's problem in the antiquity of man inseparable from the cultural problem, or the study of the one most distinctly human phenomenon in the world. It is for the geologists to determine the relative age of any particular strata bearing cultural data, it is for him to determine the fluctuation of the great ice age; it is for the biologist to determine man's genetic relationships; for the psychologist to determine his mental equipment; but it is for the anthropologist to determine the evidence of culture, the significance of such data, and render an interpretation thereof. Suppose, for example, we should ultimately find the *Pithecanthropus erectus* to be an intermediate creature without culture, could we then find a place for him in anthropology? I doubt it. I believe that by unanimous consent we would consign him to the zoölogist, whose special equipment is for dealing with such cases.

Thus we see that, whether we like it or no and in spite of anyone's personal opinion, the chief problems in anthropology have to do with culture. It is conceived that invention, the association of ideas, and other psychological activities produce cultures and they are, therefore, to be handled according to such conceptions and not those of biology. As anthropologists we do not spurn biological aid and are ready to acknowledge our obligations at all points, but we do object to introducing biological principles as parts of the data for culture. It appears that the so-called historical view is in the main an empirical one, for it insists that we formulate the relations between cultures strictly according to the data for each case and not according to more or less specific conceptions. For example, having assumed that cultures evolved from the simpler to the more complex, we should not then take the objects in museums and arrange them in that order, as a proof of the correctness of our initial assumption. That would certainly be illogical, but

you can find it in some anthropological literature of not so long ago. In many cases a principle of biological evolution has been taken and data arranged according to it. This is precisely what we have been arguing against in the preceding pages. When we say that culture is a psychological phenomenon, we have in mind an analogous conception to that of evolution in biology and a conception that is equally complicated and as difficult to state.

It may be objected that the cultural view tends to narrow the field of anthropology by restricting it to one class of human phenomena and again, on the other hand, that culture is the chief concern of sociology, and history in consequence of which anthropology cannot claim a definite field.

As you know, anthropology is made up of several more or less distinct sciences; archeology, ethnography, ethnology, and physical anthropology. If we consider these from the cultural point of view, we find the first, archeology, to be most distinctly a cultural study since the objects upon which its conclusions are based are but the indices of culture. Ethnology and ethnography are obviously concerned with cultures. Problems in physical anthropology, or comparative human anatomy, are in themselves independent of culture; but if the results are considered separately from the facts and problems of culture they have little meaning. What meaning can there be to the fact that extraordinarily wide faces are found in the extreme northern part of North America, if we ignore the existence of the Eskimo, and what will that term be to anyone without some facts of culture? In other words, though it is clear enough that physical anthropology might in a fashion be carried on oblivious of culture, it is equally clear that the results of such somatic study are useful chiefly in the solution of cultural problems. Thus it appears that the unifying principle in all the various groups of problems—archeology, physical anthropology, etc.—is the cultural problem. Without that interest we should have a number of unrelated anatomical, geographical, and psychological problems.

Furthermore, the cultural conception in anthropology is something more than the mere recognition of a province. The various divisions of anthropology may conceivably change their boundaries and their problems without breaking their connection with the cultural conception, for that conception is in

reality a theory of psychological development. It conceives that at the outset and now all men, being either one species, or of very closely allied species, they all have the same kind of mental equipment, but that since cultures are constructs, complexes of ideas, habits, and emotions, they may take any form the condition of the time makes possible. In other words, there is no mould, no fixed scheme, into which cultures must be built, the only limitations being in the constitution of the universal human. Thus, anthropologists are disposed to look upon many of the so-called laws of family and political development as useless fictions, since the nice logical sequences of Morgan and others are found incompatible with some sequences now known. By psychological analysis, cultures seem to be associations of ideas, habits, and emotions, and these seemingly follow the laws of association which leave the widest possible latitude to combinations. In fact, the particular form a culture takes is chiefly a matter of chance in the same sense that particular mental associations are accidents. In more concrete terms cultural traits are accidents of invention. Thus we find in the Plains of North America a camp circle organization, but not in the Pampas of South America, or among the Arabs of Africa and Asia, or any other part of the world. Its presence in the one case and absence in the other cannot be due to the fact that the Indians of our Plains are the only people on the earth on a particular round of a cultural ladder. Any way, anthropology failed to find such a ladder, but it has found some of the ladders for particular cultures. To put the matter in another way, we cannot tell what the cultural history of a people has been by the traits they manifest now. It will not do to assume that because a people now have iron they once had bronze. We have facts to show that certain peoples did have bronze first, but they are facts of the historic kind. The cultural conception is then distinctly empirical in that it assumes no such facts as to culture until there is evidence for the particular culture under consideration. This is no doubt why the modern method in anthropology is said to be historical and also psychological.

A moment's reflection will show that we have here something quite different from the conceptions of biology. Biological development must proceed in a genetic manner by the modification of essential characters: thus the horse's hoof is con-

ceived of as modified toes, a change that could not have come about in the life span of a single individual, indeed when the change occurred the individual first manifesting it could not have been born, however paradoxical such a statement may appear. But culture is quite independent of the individual and may be greatly changed or modified within the span of his life. Furthermore, it is less material than is often supposed, being largely a matter of psychology.

The biological view of the phenomena of anthropology would have it that a being of animal type passed gradually to one of human type and that parallel thereto went an ever-unfolding culture: the view we have just noted, or the historical cultural view, assumes that man was in some hour launched upon his career with the inventive instinct and its functioning equipment. Thus, he as it were, stood up a man and began to grapple with his problems: stone tools, fire, the bow, speech, graphic art, decorations, weaving, pottery, domestication of animals, forms of government, religious ceremonies, and war and so on and on, each in its time invented and improved. The cultural view is that each was invented by one or more groups and passed on to others. Further, that, unless there is some logical or psychological relation that necessitates one of these inventions preceding the others, we have no warrant in assuming that one of them came first or that all or many came from the same group, or that they were distributed in any certain order or manner. Whatever inner necessity or order in the sequence of these inventions may exist in the facts of European archeology is due to the logic of the case. In short, whatever fundamental laws of culture development there may be are assumed to be of a logical or psychological character and it is to that source we must look when dealing with culture. The biological conceptions of germ-plasm and unit-character have no bearing when applied to cultural problems. To say that the invention of fire-making was a mutation would be no more justifiable than to say that the achievements of the Wright Brothers was a mutation. The latter would be meaningless and so would the first. No doubt the Wright Brothers brought to their problem all the experience of others along that line and so achieved by the last straw, as it were. The history of most inventions shows that they were gradually evolved by many hands and not dropped from a clear sky. But all these relations and

complex ramifications are of a logical or psychological character and not biological.

Before concluding this discussion we wish to make sure that no one leaves with the impression that we deny any debt or influence due to Darwin. Far from it. The great awakening of that time made anthropology, as well as many other sciences, possible. We only, in common with most sociologists, insist that specific biological evolutionary conceptions be not taken as literal interpretations of cultural phenomena. And let us repeat again that anthropology's problems have to do chiefly with man's appearance upon the earth, as such, his distribution and subsequent career. Also that the data for their solution are found chiefly in cultural phenomena which are in themselves essentially psychological. The eolithic problem is a good example of the necessity of an appeal to cultural phenomena in the solution of the main problem of anthropology. Thus, it will not do to argue that, when flint chips are found, man must have been, because chips have been made by other than human forces; but, when chips are found in definite association with kitchen middens, broken bones, charcoal, or other possible traces of man, they become positive evidence. Thus it is the associated character of these objects that furnishes our safest clue to the presence of man, and such associated factors constitute culture as anthropologists conceive it.

In general we may formulate our interpretation of the historical conception of anthropology by renaming it the cultural point of view. Culture itself seems to be associated habit-complexes or constructs of the mind and not to be in any way innate or inborn, but to be an external affair, preserved and carried on entirely by learning or educating processes. Cultures develop and have an evolution of their own, but since they are not inherited they cannot be considered parts of a biological development. They are most assuredly facts of another order. Being products of the mind, the only limitations put upon them are to be sought in the mind itself, and since psychologists tell us that we have in the main only an associated cultural whole, resolvable into psychological elements, and since this in turn is only a matter of relation in time and attributes, we may reject the idea that cultures are predetermined or follow any design within the psychological limits imposed by life. If, then, there is an evolution of culture, it is to be conceived only

in logical or psychological terms. There is, for example, a kind of genetic relationship between the flint chip and the razor, but it is a matter of invention and not of cell differentiation. Being a matter of invention, the genetic relationship becomes purely a matter of history, since we cannot foretell what the relationship is.

We have seen that there is a clear distinction between cultures on the one hand and the psycho-physical mechanisms that produce them on the other. The mechanisms are biological and are innate and constitute man's equipment for the production of cultures. Anthropology holds that the mechanism is general, in so far as it is not limited to any particular culture, and that it enables the individual to practice any culture he may meet, though not necessarily to equal degrees.

When we come to consider the biological theory of evolution, we find that it applies to the psycho-physical mechanism but not to culture. For cultures we must have another point of view or theory, and this in America at least is the historical or cultural conception. This conception is in general that cultural traits are the results of invention, a mental process, and their development or evolution is to be taken as a historical and psychological problem. In this cultural conception and all that it implies, anthropology has an insight into the phenomena of its chosen field, as vitalizing to it as Darwinism is to zoölogy.

RELIGION AND MAGIC: DEFINITIONS AND RELATIONS

By WILSON D. WALLIS,
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia

Professor James H. Leuba, in his book entitled *A Psychological Study of Religion: Its Origin, Function, and Future*, has attempted not only such psychological studies as the title would imply, but, in addition, has given us definitions of religion and of magic, and has, moreover, set forth the relationship between magic and religion—or rather the absence of any such relationship.

Let us first see how he defines religion.

It is true that an isolation of sentences from their context makes possible a juxtaposition giving altogether a false and unfair interpretation which is not in keeping with the author's purposes. We shall, however, have to ask the reader to consult these passages for himself. They seem to us to express vacillating and sometimes inconsistent points of view, as we pass from chapter to chapter, rather than to express various phases of the same thing. On page 8, we find that "what belong exclusively to religion are not the impulses, the desires, and yearnings to which these conceptions of a blessed future owe their existence, but merely the conceptions themselves." Why such conceptions belong exclusively to religion and not to poetry and imagination as well, or how the conceptions are to be separated from the impulses, desires and yearnings to which they mutually owe their existence—for separately *ils n'existent pas*—is too important in this connection not to have been considered, though the problem has not been elucidated. 'Super-human' and 'supernatural' are ruled out as having no relevancy in religion, unless "merely with reference to the gods and their action on man, should they have an existence outside the mind of the believer" (p. 9). The sense of mystery is not itself the beginning of religion, but *religion begins when the mystery has been given some solution*, naïve or critical, making possible practical relations with the 'ultimate.' Therefore, "*if men have lived by religion*" it is not because they have recognized the

mystery, but rather because they have, in their uncritical purposive way, transcended the mystery, and have posited a solution of which they were able to make practical use" (p. 28). From philosophy it is distinguished in this way: "Philosophy searches for explanations, for intellectual unification: religion assumes knowledge and maintains dynamic relations with psychic powers greater than man. The distinction may be expressed thus: the religious consciousness seeks being; the philosophical consciousness seeks knowledge. Considered from the intellectual side, religion postulates, philosophy inquires" (pp. 30-31). If, in place of religion, we write 'intellectual dogmatism' will this distinction not equally apply? Yet it would not be fair to impute to the author the standpoint that identifies religion with intellectual dogmatism or considers the one as merely a sub-division of the other, although this would seem to be a logical deduction from his theory. "Religion rests upon various conceptions regarding the world and man" (p. 34), though how it can do so without itself involving or implying certain philosophic conceptions is incomprehensible. In order to do this it must seek knowledge or be taken to presuppose that knowledge has already been sought by it. In other words, it seems that here too 'intellectual dogmatism' could equally well be substituted for 'religion,' though 'intellectual dogmatism' will scarcely be able to rest itself on various conceptions, including current ones, without some of that seeking for knowledge which is supposed to be beneath or above it.

On page 52 there seems to be a shifting of point of view. "Religion is that part of human experience in which man feels himself in relation with powers of psychic nature, usually personal powers, and makes use of them. . . . Nothing is less an abstraction than the religious life; it includes the whole man. A belief in psychic powers, personal or impersonal, is but one of the conditions of its existence. It cannot be adequately defined either in terms of feeling or of purpose." How then can it be defined? The argument on pages 30-31 seemed to define it in terms of purpose, unless the seeking and postulating there assigned to religion were purposeless. Of course, if religion includes the whole man—which is much more and yet seems to have something in common with Tolstoy's definition of religion as one's attitude toward the universe—then religion means

anything and everything so long as you speak in terms of human psychology. This, however, will not help us much either in understanding it or in differentiating it from other departments, such as philosophy and science. The author himself forthwith repudiates its application to all of life (p. 53).

What then is for the author the *sine qua non* of religion? Not feeling, for "in the absence of the mystical form of consciousness religion might still exist and find embodiment in most of the religious institutions with which we are familiar." It seems to inhere in a belief in psychic energy: "The conception of the source of psychic energy, without belief in which no religion can exist, has undergone very interesting transformations in the course of historical development" (p. 124). This psychic power is, moreover, superhuman: "Any solution that provides for the preservation and perfection of life by means of faith in a hyperhuman, psychic power will have the right to the name religion" (p. 125). Faith is linked to works: "When man is concerned with his *practical relation* to psychic, superhuman powers, any ideas—immoral or otherwise—that he may hold regarding these powers belong to religion" (p. 204).

The obscurity into which the author seems to have fallen may probably be attributed to a lack of discrimination among the various phenomena called religions. Nearly everything is called religion by one writer or another and under this one word are classed phenomena so disparate and unrelated, either genetically or teleologically, as to deserve separate designations. It were better, for the sake of clearness and progress, to use some X term for designating all these things which have at one time or another been called 'religion' and to distinguish among them between at least (1) cults and cult activities, (2) emotional attitudes, (3) intellectual attitudes. To this distinction we will return in a subsequent paragraph.

How does the author of *A Psychological Study of Religion* define magic? Scarcely at all except by negative attributes, though a chapter is given to the "Varieties and Classification of Magic" (Ch. VIII). We have, however, the distinction stated in this way: "Magic separates itself, on the one hand, from mechanical behavior by the absence of implied quantitative relations, and, on the other hand, from anthropopathic behavior

(which includes religion) by the failure to use means of personal influence" (p. 5). Again:

"The original idea of non-personal power possesses but one necessary characteristic: it is dynamic, it does things. Man's attitude towards it shows plainly that neither intelligence nor feeling is a necessary element in its composition. As the workings of this power are to a great extent unforeseen and uncontrollable, it evokes frequently dread and awe; but in so far as man thinks himself able to control and use it, it loses its mysteriousness and awfulness and becomes a familiar power. As it is not definitely conceived as intelligent will, the attitudes and the behavior it can elicit on the part of man are fundamentally different from those produced by the belief in personal, unseen powers. The former gives rise to magic; the latter, to religion" (p. 83).

In suggesting the name '*dynamism*' for Marett's '*supernaturalism*,' the author is following van Gennep (*Rites de Passages*).

The author expresses under the following seven heads his theory of the relation between magic and religion (p. 176):

"1. Magic and religion have had independent origins. Neither of them needs be regarded as a development from the other.

"2. Magic contributed very little directly to the making of religion.

"3. The simpler forms of magic probably antedated religion.

"4. Because they are different ways of achieving the same end, magical and religious practices are closely associated.

"5. Religion is social and beneficial; magic is dominantly individual and often evil.

"6. Magic is of shorter duration than religion.

"7. Science is closely related neither to magic nor to religion, but to the mechanical type of behavior."

The very form in which these distinctions are stated seems to presuppose some relation of a very definite historical and genetic character between magic and religion. If they have had independent origins, what ground can there be for supposing magic to have antedated religion? We do not remember having found an answer to this question. When, further, it is admitted that, being "different ways of achieving the same ends, magical and religious practices are closely associated," and that the essential difference is found in the distinction that "religion is social and beneficial; magic is dominantly individual and often evil," one is almost compelled to conclude that the author is either thinking of different aspects of the same thing, or of developments from some previously undifferentiated phase of belief or

activity. There is, however, an attempt to treat them as two separate entities:

"The priority of magic does not, of course, mean that there has been no overlapping of the periods during which the two modes of behavior came into existence: but only that magic probably began before religion. The problem of priority would be of great importance were magic and religion genetically related. But, as this is not the case, the question possesses little real significance" (p. 181).

Yet how reconcile with this the statement on page 332 in which we are told that "magic, religion, poetry, philosophy, grew together inseparably. It was only as different aims were distinctly conceived, and different means and methods of realizing them appeared, that the original plenum broke into parts. Magic became clearly separated from religion; religious dogmas from myths and legends; poetry acquired an existence independent of both religion and myth; and philosophy was seen to have its own particular purpose and another content than religion."

What then? Are magic and religion genetically related or are they not? There is confusion on this point:

"If this utterance is to be regarded as an attempt to project the operators' 'will' upon the enemies, we are in the realm of pure magic. But if it is to be understood as a request addressed to a personal being, it is a prayer, and then we deal probably with an instance of the combination of magic with religion" (p. 182).

Is the transition difficult? Difficult or not, let us see in what the characteristic difference between the two aspects, the magical and the religious, consists:

"I have no wish whatsoever to deny that the spell often passes into prayer and that the magical instrument may be deified; and I quite agree that magic and religion join forces. But the term 'blood-relation' means a closer relation than that obtaining between them, and the accusation that the distinction between these two forms of behavior is artificial does not seem to me warranted. The feeling-attitude of magic is always distinct from the feeling-attitude properly called religion, because the Powers to which magic and religion respectively address themselves are of a different nature. There is nothing in Marett's instances that would give one the right to gainsay what I have insisted regarding the definiteness of the distinction. Magic and religion are frequently allies *because they often have the same end*, but an alliance prompted by a common purpose is not a blood relationship. And if one chooses to speak of magic as 'evolving' into religion, one should not understand by that expression that, because of an essential identity of nature, the one becomes the other. That which hap-

pens is merely that, having two instruments at his service for producing one and the same result, the savage uses them simultaneously or in succession" (p. 183).

In at least one more passage (pp. 184-5) there is evidence of a tendency to minimize the difference between magic and religion, especially in their genetic relationship. Thus, the author says emphatically, "there is nothing in the nature of magic to make it *necessarily* personal, secret or evil. On the one hand, there is an abundance of magic performed not for an individual only, but for a group, or for the whole tribe,—a magic, the technique of which is public and the intention benevolent. . . . And, on the other hand, there are stages in the later life of nations, during which religion is predominantly a personal matter." Hence, the distinction "religion is social and beneficent; magic is dominantly individual and often evil," is one of fortuitous circumstance rather than inherent qualities. It merely tells us the different ways in which they act when once they have been recognized as separate things or tendencies; it in no manner furnishes us a clue whereby to identify religion as religion or magic as magic, when we find ourselves troubled over a distinction.

The chapter on the "Varieties and Classification of Magic" (VIII)—or "The Origin of Magical and of Religious Practices," is again unsatisfactory from the point of view of clearness and validity of distinction.

"The term 'magic' I would restrict to those practices intended to secure some definite gain by coercitive action, in essential disregard, (1) of the quantitative relations implied in the ordinary and in the scientific dealings with the physical world; (2) of the anthropopathic relations obtaining among persons" (p. 151).

Accepting this definition, it is not clear that the phenomena subsumed under the 'principle of repetition' properly fall within it. This 'principle of repetition' is explained as follows (p. 159): "Something that has happened once is likely to happen again. A successful arrow will meet with further success, and one that has failed with further failure." He gives an instance in point:

"The Bushmen despise an arrow that has once failed of its mark, and, on the contrary, consider one that has hit as of double value. They will, therefore, rather make new arrows, how much time and trouble soever it

may cost them, than collect those that have missed and use them again.' Similarly, other tribes attach a special value to a hook that has caught a big fish. . . . Nothing need be involved here, it seems to me, but the conviction that something that has happened once is likely to happen again. No principle is simpler and more firmly established than this; it is an imperfect form of this corollary of the Principle of Identity; something that has happened once will happen again under identical circumstances. The savage goes wrong because, instead of taking into account all the circumstances, he thinks merely of the hook. But, if he prizes the hook, not simply because it has already caught fish, but because he thinks of the hook as possessing an attractive power over fish, the mental process at the root of his action is another and a more complex one: he now believes in action at a distance."

The author does not tell us what meaning should be attached to "the quantitative relations implied in the ordinary and in the scientific dealings with the physical world" which is one of the 'essential disregards' exhibited by magic. If, however, the principle of repetition as explained above is one of them it seems clear that we must all of us plead guilty to playing the magician in the greater part of our dealings with the physical world. Whenever we, like the savage, go wrong from failure to 'take into account all the circumstances,' we add to the mass of magical phenomena; and this is every day and practically all the time. When I wait for the street-car at a certain corner expecting that it will come as it did when I was there last, I am thinking merely of the car and not taking into account all the circumstances upon which its coming depends. Even in the matter of hooks the writer confesses to a great deal of sympathy with the savage magic. If a grey fly has caught a large trout and the yellow one has brought me nothing, I act upon the principle that the former has an attractive power over trout not shown by the latter. Even when I cast in another rapid I act upon this principle, although, to be sure, I am 'thinking merely of the hook' and not 'taking into account all the circumstances.' In a word, the objection to the above distinction is that it does not distinguish.

Mrs. Beshears' attitude has a great deal in common with that of the Bushman. "'Folks ask me why I don't have the place fixed up,' she would say; 'but who on earth shall I fix it up for? Pop started to fix it up, but he took sick and died; and then Uriah (her husband) he begun to fix it up, and he took sick and died. It's the living truth. Now, whoever wants to fix it

up is welcome to try it. I'm old and ugly, but I don't want to be put on my cooling-board on account of driving a new set of nails in the front palings.' " This was a failure to take into account all the circumstances. For Professor Leuba, it would be magic; for us, too, it would be magic, but rather because of its contrast with our more critic scientific inductions, and not because of a failure to do what science likewise fails to do, viz., take into consideration all the circumstances. I cannot agree with Professor Leuba in his conclusion that "if primitive man does not discriminate, then the distinction has no application to the mental processes involved in savage magic." (The distinction is between 'like produces like' and 'an effect resembles its cause.') "If the savage is aware of this difference, the two mental processes should not be included under one principle" (p. 159). But whether the savage is or is not aware of this difference, must we not say that the two mental processes should not be included under one principle? If we are describing the associative processes in a given individual, A, does it matter from the point of view of objective value and legitimacy of distinction, whether A recognizes two laws of the association of ideas or subsumes all under one—supposing that he associates 'temporally' and 'spatially'?

Moreover, we seem to be reading into the savage's mind something which is not there when we attribute belief in action at a distance to him because of the recognition of the attractive power over fish which a hook possesses. Human beings recognised the fact that bodies fall to the earth many centuries before they arrived at the conception of gravitation, though it is certain that they acted like those who realized the validity of such an assumption. But 'bodies fall to the earth' and 'gravitation' are two things and the first principle may be recognised long before an appreciation of the second is arrived at. This tendency to read a meaning or a confusion into the savage point of view, which meaning or which confusion may exist for Professor Leuba, but does not exist for the savage, appears in many places throughout the book and is a fundamental objection to a great part of his method of treatment. This error confesses itself explicitly in the following sentences from a chapter through a great part of which it is implicit: "In this attempt at classification, I would not give the impression that the conceptions of the savage are clear and definite. On the contrary,

I hold them to be hazy and fluid. What appears to him impersonal at one moment may suddenly assume the characteristics of a spirit. *Mana*, for instance, although usually an impersonal force stored in plants, stones, animals, or men, takes on at times truly personal traits." It is quite probable that our conception of what the Melanesian means or understands by *mana* may be both hazy and fluid; but a reading of Codrington gives no ground for supposing that the Melanesian's conception of *mana* is either hazy or fluid; at least, not more so than the conceptions we entertain with regard, for example, to 'life,' 'force,' 'influence,' etc. Durkheim is guilty of the same mistake of reading into the savages' categories and classifications which are suited to his own purposes, a confusion that is not present in native thought. (See his *Les Formes Élémentaires de la Vie Religieuse Le Système Totémique en Australie*, pp. 337, 464.) The gifted Mr. Dudley Kidd makes the same error with regard to the Kafirs, a people with whom he was well acquainted (*The Essential Kafir*, p. 70.) It is, in another form, the 'confusion of categories' of which Mr. Hobhouse speaks (*Morals in Evolution*), but the confusion is rather in the mind of the writers themselves than in that of the natives who are so accused because of their disregard of our point of view and a categorizing that is at utter variance from our own. If we suppose his conceptions confused, it is because we try to look at his world through our colored lenses rather than through his. A fact of social or of psychic life may mean, perhaps we should say must mean, one thing to a member of that social group and quite a different thing to one who is outside it. The native from whom you collect your ethnographical material may know the facts of his tribal life infinitely better than you can hope ever to know them; but you may understand the scientific value of that partial evidence in a way that is impossible for him and fixes a gulf between you and him as regards ethnological science. The savages' magic is such for you, but to him it may be as much a causal and inevitable effect as any of your scientifically demonstrated laws. You and he are categorizing in different manners and, as the fact is determined by the class as much as the class by the facts, there is little meaning in the statement that you and he are thinking of the same fact when your thought and his are directed toward the phenomenon which is for him an efficient cause, for you a superstition without objective validity.

To this attributing of our standpoint to other people and the failure, through inattention or sheer inability to get theirs, must be credited most of the misunderstanding which always exists when people of one social and cultural setting come into contact with those of a markedly different one. Imagine an aboriginal Australian, who has never heard of any culture save his own, suddenly dropped into our midst, attempting to find out the important things in our social life. Could he possibly get any idea of the value of our universities or educational movements? Would he not rather look to our dances and festivities, our food-quest, and to fraternity and masonic initiations as the things corresponding to his own social influences? Just so when we collect ethnographical material for our own scientific purposes we are apt to see the facts merely in our anthropological categories and to neglect the view-point of the native altogether. In so doing we merely show ourselves to be fundamentally of close kin with him. If, in the light of the comparatively unenthusiastic sex-relations among ourselves, he should conclude that the sex-life is most dull and uninteresting in our social group—as he certainly would be forced to infer—he would merely reflect our partial grasp of the situation when we make our deductions with regard to the facts of his social life. Not having the same interest in the facts of magic we miss their import, just as he, without an interest in educational movements, must miss the value of our educational institutions. It is only by increasing knowledge of his whole social and cultural setting that we can even approximate his view-point and come to a half-way understanding of the value for him of the various phases of his life. It is the old principle of relativity, easy to recognise in theory and difficult to apply in the actual situations where we seek to remain consistent with it.

A case in point, where we meet with a failure to apply it, or an instance of its wrong application, is the magic of the dance as found in Madagascar (pp. 156-7) :

“In Madagascar the women say that by dancing they impart strength, courage, and good fortune to their husbands. Why bring these various ceremonies back to an intention of keeping the warriors awake? [This, by way of objection to Mr. Frazer’s explanation.] Some of the actions may be inspired by that purpose, but why all of them? Let us say rather that the anxiety of the women tends to work itself off in spontaneous movements, some of them having, in the beginning at least, no mimetic or telepathic connection with the fighting of the husbands. They

simply dance or jump up and down for relief, and the relief felt leads to the repetition of the movement. Thus the dancing habit is formed," etc.

Does this line of argument have a more satisfying effect than that of the criticized Mr. Frazer? It is different in outcome but not in kind. Both recognize possible explanations and argue for the one which to them seems *a priori* more probable. Neither seems concerned with the related concepts and activities which play about this particular *motive* in this particular cultural group. Yet surely the matter must be approached in this way if at all. Otherwise the preferred explanation will be found in most cases to depend merely on an expectation based upon previous chance acquaintance with apparently similar phenomena. To one who has just come from the Miemac tribe, for example, where the reason given for this joyous activity of the women during the absence of the warriors is, that it keeps up the strength and spirits of the braves and insures that they, too, will be happy, their happiness insuring that they will succeed, a different explanation will, *a priori*, seem more probable. There is a certain plausibility in Professor Leuba's solution, and yet some of us would not grant that feminine anxiety tends to work itself off in spontaneous movements of this very pronounced hilarious tone, and even if we did, would find it insufficient ground for an explanation of this phase of Madagascar life. Only with an acquaintance of the facts in that particular tribe can any adequate explanation be found.

Nor can we agree that "the psychologist may regard his task as completed when he has pointed out the several possible origins of the god-ideas, the characteristics of each, and the nature of the general causes which determine the dominance of particular gods" (p. 99). This is rather the beginning than the end of his task. Psychology is properly concerned with description of actualities rather than possibilities, with the concrete rather than the general. At least it must proceed from the actual and the concrete whereby alone we shall get the possible and the general. If we might recast the above sentence, we would say that the task of the psychologist is not completed until he has pointed out the several actual historical origins of the various respective god-ideas, the definite characteristics of each, and the nature in detail of the particular causes which determine, as also the particular phenomena which express the

dominance of particular gods. In a word, the psychologist can draw his deductions only after an intensive study of a given cultural group, or after comparisons based on intensive studies of various cultural groups in each of which the facts are given amplest opportunity to tell their several stories. This will contribute lasting foundation-stones on which to build more pretentious theories, but it will be well to look carefully to the particular initial results, since on their freedom from error the safety of the superstructure must be, at least in part, dependent. Moreover, such a program would represent, with each thorough analysis, a step in advance as distinguished from mere amassing.

If the preceding be the proper procedure, it must be regarded as in a sense unfortunate that "the psychologist in search of knowledge concerning origins turns naturally to the child to supplement anthropological data" (p. 77). To supplement its use might be regarded as legitimate, but too often the psychologist who seeks there for origins uses his results to explain and interpret anthropological data, to prove the superiority of one preferred explanation over other possible ones. The author himself is not free from this use of material. "The idea of a mighty Maker of things may safely be attributed to men as low in intelligence as are the lowest tribes now extant, for it appears very early in the child" (p. 96). "If children five years old begin of themselves to inquire into the origin of the world, one must admit the presence of such queries in the mind of the most intelligent individuals of the lowest tribes" (p. 97). "The idea of a Maker I suppose to have originally presented itself to the race very much as it does to a five- or six-year-old child who is suddenly struck with the idea that some one must have made the world" (p. 104). We are grateful for the information as to what age of the child corresponds to development of the race when it (the race) was suddenly struck with the idea that some one must have made the world; we should be doubly grateful had we been told at what point of development—either culturally or temporally—this sudden stroke fell. As a matter of fact—it is a difficulty to which the ethnologist can not close his eyes—all of the existing tribes known to us do not have a conception of a Maker such as the author supposes, nor is it true by any means of all of those having such a conception that such a concept is 'awe-inspiring,' nor that

"some degree of interest and benevolence towards that which he has made is also . . . unavoidably associated with even the simplest idea of a Maker." One need mention merely the culture-hero, Gluskap, of the Algonquin region, and Coyote of the Plains Culture—including, certainly, a by no means negligible number of tribes—as cases in point. It is not clear that these suppositions, contrary to fact, can really help us forward in the way that a survey based on psychological analyses of various cultural groups might do.

Who are these children whose experiences give the author a clue to the original conceptions of the race, and an insight into the development of religious concepts among savages? One might suppose that, if any children would furnish us the key to the situation, it would be the children of these same extant savages about whom we are puzzled. But the author makes no use of such material nor expresses any concern over the lack of it.

The analogy should work both ways. That is to say, if we can infer from the child what we shall find in the savage, from the savage we ought to be able to infer what we shall find in the child. If Professor Leuba would agree to this logical deduction from his theory and working principle, it would be interesting to know what one of the few thousand existing tribes, each with its own culture, is most nearly analogous to the civilized child at, to use his figures, five or six years of age. It would certainly take as many children as there are tribes to furnish any very complete analogy. If the author replies that he makes the analogy only in the case of the religious consciousness, we have a right to know why this is singled out rather than the making of bows and arrows and stone implements or the method of constructing sentences. These are vital points, the importance of which can not be minimized by refusing to consider them. No analogy between the child and the savage will avail much in explaining origins until the presuppositions in such analogies are fully realized and carefully considered.

It is doubtful whether analogies between the civilized child and the savage adult will ever clear up these difficulties. It is pure fiction and falsehood to call the savages children of nature—they are as old as ourselves. They may be more 'rudimentary'—they are not more 'primitive' than are we. Like-

wise, to call them a 'sort of contemporaneous ancestry' is false, if we suppose this enhances the value of their culture for purposes of analogy with our own or with that of our children. The analogy is false, and, if hard pressed, will certainly be misleading, since the children of whom the author speaks grow up and their development is unfolded in an environment of their adults, in conformity with which they are themselves being molded, and this environment is essentially different from that of savage communities; whereas the adult savage lives in an environment to which he has already been moulded and modified and which he now affirms and helps to perpetuate, however small a part he may have played in creating it. If either heredity or environment may be taken to count for much the analogy between the civilized child and the adult savage will never be entitled to the name of more than chance correspondences, and any inference drawn therefrom will be mere gratuitous assumption based on presuppositions that can carry no conviction. Children may be suddenly struck with ideas of a Maker, but, so far as we have evidence and can further infer, it appears that primitive or savage man as we know him is not suddenly struck with such or like conceptions, these apparently having evolved like everything in his life which is not exotic, through long periods of time, from very crude forms by imperceptible or almost imperceptible accretions or modifications. The author approaches the matter somewhat after the manner of Diodorus, who tells us that "the aboriginal inhabitants of Egypt, looking up to the sky, and smitten with awe and wonder at the nature of the universe, supposed that there were two gods, eternal and primeval, the sun and the moon, of whom they named the sun Osiris and the moon Isis" (I. 11).

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We have set forth in another place (see the *JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY*, July, 1912, an article entitled "The Element of Fear in Religion") something of our conception of the relation between magic and religion and of the emotional elements involved in them. We should scarcely go so far as the Euthyphro of Plato in saying that "where there is fear, there is also reverence"; nor do we believe with a recent writer that religion "plays no part in biological evolution, and its origin as well as its purpose are obscure." (Kroeber, in

American Anthropologist, 1910, N. S. 12, p. 444.) We have tried to show, however, that certain attitudes, certain emotional and physiological reactions are common in the presence of phenomena which may be classed as unusual or apparently uncaused. The peculiar sound of the bull-roarer as used in Australia and Melanesia was cited as a case in point. When it is known to the women and children, as is the case in some tribes of Australia, they have no fear of it; but when the cause of the sound is kept secret from them and they are never allowed to see the object nor witness its use in producing the peculiar sound which it gives forth, there is a sense of mystery inspiring fear. In Melanesia we meet with further illustration of the tendency of this emotional attitude to vary with knowledge. In some parts of the Banks Island, for example, bull-roarers are sounded for driving away a ghost. But the bull-roarer has become "too well-known in the Banks Island to be used in mysteries," and the secret societies have had to replace it with another peculiar apparatus; to insure its nature being kept a secret, they went so far, according to the narrative, as to kill the woman who was using it. It shows how determined they were to keep hidden from the eyes of the uninitiated the "cry or voice of the ghost," the impressiveness of which would diminish with knowledge of its nature. Accordingly—not lacking resource in time of need—"the butt-end of a fan of palm is rubbed over a flat, smooth stone and the result is a vibration which produces an extraordinary sound, which can be modulated in strength and tone at the will of the performer, and which proceeding in the stillness of daybreak from the mysterious recesses of the *salagoro*, may well have carried with it the assurance of a supernatural presence and power." In Florida Island it was used at night in company with other contrivances for raising a din and making unusual noises, to frighten the women. Again observe how its impressiveness varies with the state of ignorance as to its nature:

"It is there only that any superstitious character belongs to it. There is no mystery about it when it is used in the Banks Island to drive away a ghost, as in Mota, where it is called *nanamatea*, death-maker, or to make a mourning sound, as in Merlav, where it is called *worung-tamb*, a wailer, and used the night after a death. It is a common plaything; in Vanua Lava they call it *mala*, a pig, from the noise it makes; in Maewo it is *tal-viv*, a whirring string, in Araga it is merely *tavire bua*, a bit of bamboo." (Codrington, *The Melanesians*, pp. 267, 80, 98-9, 342.)

So far as the emotional attitude toward these phenomena is one of fear not unmingled with reverence, or of awe approaching reverence and tinged with fear, we would be justified in calling it religious. As it has been expressed, "Religion is essentially an emotional attitude toward the universe, especially toward unknown powers or agencies which are supposed to be behind its phenomena. Practically religion is a desire to come into right relations with these unknown powers or agencies." But this latter sentence expressing rather man's action upon the religious attitude should not be confused with the emotional attitude itself, however closely related they be. This action may take many forms although the emotional attitude that prompted it may be the same in all of these cases which eventuate so differently. We must also carefully distinguish a third thing, viz., the cult activity, the tendency to bring all the individuals of a certain group under uniform rules of behavior. Unfortunately, the term religion is applied to all of them alike; hence, in part, the confusion that arises in any discussion of 'religion.' We may, of course, be made participants in the cult activity without ever experiencing the emotional attitude which we call religious; in which case the phenomena would better be interpreted in terms of social psychology based on group activities and suggestions.

The nomenclature is comparatively unimportant, but the distinction is all-important. There seem to be intense psychic states of ecstasy that give rise to cult activities which are usually termed religions. Mohammedanism, both in its early history and up to the present time, furnishes ample illustration. This merely shows that cult activities, or, if you will, religious orders, may arise from different psychic states and emotional attitudes, and it is all important in a search for origins and tendencies to know the historico-psychological development. Yet, if there is a distinguishing emotional element, we must admit that, if the suggestions of social psychology will account for its development, we may or may not have religious attitudes and emotions in the most pronounced and most widely diffused cult activities or so-called religions. As a matter purely of terminology the writer has no desire to insist on limiting the application of religious emotion or religious attitude toward these phenomena of the unusual or supernatural. Yet it seems to be principally to them that all peoples and all religions

alike look for evidences of the god, and whether they do or do not consider them as evidence of the divine, all alike have this emotional attitude toward phenomena which are, in their experience, supernatural or apparently uncaused. "Now when the child was born it carried with it a handful of hair. And all the people marvelled. Then the child spoke, and said: 'This is the work of God.' And the people ran away, they were so much afraid."

This instance, from Mr. R. E. Dennett's, *Folklore of the Fjort* (p. 56), might be paralleled from almost any cultural area in which the divine is recognized. The god or superior power manifests himself not in the usual affairs of life—this comes only with higher thought and a preceding intellectual activity truly philosophic in character—but almost invariably in the unusual. All of the gods move in mysterious ways their wonders to perform. Moreover, those who do not reverence a superior being experience the same emotional and physiological reactions in the presence of such phenomena. It seems to us there are weighty reasons to induce us to call that emotional attitude religious, irrespective of its reference to a power or being beyond it. The initial attitude or emotion is little if any changed because of the explanation or reference to the Being beyond it and working through it, so that we may fairly well distinguish origin or initial tendency from later development and later modified tendencies. Hence, religion has its source in an emotion and a tendency to act in the presence of such phenomena as are for that individual more or less vaguely realised as incomprehensible, supernatural. It is man's attitude towards the unknown—unknown in the sense of that which transcends or shatters the categories through which he has contemplated his experiences.

We go from one thing to another and to an essentially different one when we speak of the explanation of these phenomena as given by the individuals who experience them. It has been said that the average Christian of a generation ago, who accepted the doctrine of body, soul, and spirit, would have been unable to give any lucid explanation of their interrelation. As much might be said of the average Christian of to-day; yet the matter has little bearing on the nature of their religion but rather on the question of the philosophic concepts that were invented later to explain or justify their religion. The

things which are capable of arousing the religious attitude are not sufficiently objective to be independent of the culture of the group. They depend much on the intellectual advancement and the nature of the experience of the individual. In some, only physical phenomena may suffice to give it life. It may be found in a contemplation of things which partake of infinity, or a 'sort of cosmic emotion' which the scientist who is peering deeply into the recesses or far into the vastnesses of the universe is said sometimes to experience, and which may not be essentially unlike that of the cruder philosopher and cruder scientist in savage society. Hence, when Mr. Russell would define religion as the desire to escape the petty worries, trivialities, and limitations of finite life by linking oneself with the infinite, he seems to be expressing either his ideal as a philosopher of the true worth of religious attitude, or what he supposes others would express by way of explanation. He does not seem to give what his article proclaims, viz., "the essence of religion." His 'universal love,' for example, may carry meaning to the mind of some, but it will scarcely appeal to the common man—in the case of the writer it fails to express a meaning.

It is not clear that psychology can ever give us evaluations of religion or religious systems, though one hears from many quarters such a doctrine. It will never give us more than a description—it will not furnish ideals or be capable, however well it has described and however intimately it has penetrated and analyzed and classified, of giving comparative values or any hierarchy of ends to be desired. Psychology may be in some sense an aggregate of knowledge about various theological systems or religious beliefs, but to say that "*la philosophie (aussi) est comme la conscience collective de la science*" is absurd. *La philosophie* has a higher function and one to which psychology must be subordinate.

How, then, shall we define magic? Has it, as we have been assured, no relation to science, and what shall we say of its relation to religion?

In any discussion of the nature of magic we must, it seems to me, make a distinction at the very outset of our task as to whether we shall consider magic from our point of view or from the point of view of the tribe, class or individual which

practises the magic. Regarded from the point of view of higher culture, most magic is merely, objectively, inchoate science. It expresses the scientific conception of the world arrived at by the experimentation and philosophy of the people who practice it. The magical acts are performed with belief in their adequacy even as we believe in the beneficial effects of prescribed remedies the nature of whose workings we do not understand.

"No less than ourselves, our remote ancestors were impressed with the importance of natural phenomena and with the desirability of taking energetic measures to regulate the sequence of events. Under the influence of irrelevant ideas they executed elaborate religious ceremonies to aid the birth of the new moon, and performed sacrifices to save the sun during the crisis of an eclipse. There is no reason to believe that they were more stupid than we are. But at that epoch there had not been opportunity for the slow accumulation of clear and relevant ideas." (Whitehead, *Introd. to Mathematics*, p. 31.)

Why then, it may be asked, do we not look upon the whole of their activities as magical performances, rather than single out certain portions of these and label them and not others magic? Simply because we are struck by what is, for us, fake science, false concepts based on insufficient experience or incorrect induction. If it was magic when the Bushman cut off the end of a finger to release the spirit of sickness, it was no less magic when doctors bled, to let out the phlegm in the blood which, it was believed, caused the disease, and it was none the less magic to believe, as we did believe, in the power of witches to work injury. As soon as we have outgrown these conceptions and substituted others we call the cast-off ones magic or superstition. Thus the cast-off clothes of science are fallen to the lot of magic or of superstition.

There are also other phenomena classed by us as magical, those, namely, in whose genuineness we believe although the means are not understood and we suppose them to contradict the laws known to science. The philosopher and scientist may recognise no magic of this kind, but the uncritical man may and often does. To him the use of means whose efficacy he does not comprehend rather increases than lessens his respect for the phenomena.

In this connection the examples given by a physician, Dr. R. E. Lawrence, in a recent book of great value, entitled *Primi-*

tive Psychotherapy and Quackery (1910), are much to the point and some of them may be cited here by way of illustrating this aspect of the magical. He says (p. 43):

"The influence of technical language on the uneducated patient is exemplified in the effect produced on his mind by the mention of Latin names. The writer was impressed with this fact while engaged in dispensary practice some years ago. Such a patient, affected with mumps, for example, appears to experience a certain satisfaction, and is apt to be somewhat puffed up mentally as well as physically, when he learns that his ailment is *Cynanche Paratidæa*; and he expects a prescription commensurate with its importance."

Also (p. 39):

"Ignorant people are usually impressed by obscure phrases, the more so, if these are well sprinkled with polysyllables. Cicero, in his treatise on *Divination* (LXIV) criticizes the lack of perspicuity in the style of certain writers, and supposes the case of a physician who should prescribe a snail as an article of diet, and whose prescription should read, 'an earth-born, grass-walking, house-carrying, unsanguineous animal.' Equally efficacious might be the modern definition of the same creature as a 'terrestrial, air-breathing, gastropodous mollusk.' The degree of efficiency of such prescriptions is naturally in inverse proportion to the patient's mental culture. An average Southern negro, for example, affected with indigestion, might derive some therapeutic advantage from snail diet, but would be more likely to be benefited by the mental stimulus afforded by the verbose formula."

And (p. 235):

"A lady once asked her apothecary, an ignorant fellow, regarding the composition of castor oil, and seemed quite content with his reply, that it was extracted from the beaver. Another patient asked her physician how long she was likely to be ill, and was told that it depended largely on the duration of the disease. A certain doctor, probably a quack, acquired some notoriety by always prescribing the *left* leg of a boiled fowl. Reiteration of the superior nutritive qualities of that member, and positive assertions of the comparative worthlessness of the right leg, doubtless impressed the patients' minds in a salutary manner."

As Lawrence says, "so long as the love of the marvellous exists, there will be a certain demand for quackery, and the supply will not be wanting."

It is not clear whether satisfaction with explanations of this kind finds its explanation in the fact that it satisfies some positive want or is rather to be set down to mental laziness and inertia or sheer inability to think critically. It is true that "it takes more provision for a cruise to the Cape of Good Hope

than for a trip to the Isle of Dogs," and for the unthinking "to value wisdom is already to be wise." Whatever the explanation, it seems in large part true that "with ignorant people, the mysteries of ignorance are valued above wisdom." Miss Mary Kingsley (*Travels in West Africa*, p. 468) cites the case of a woman who had suddenly dropped down dead on a factory beach at Corisco Bay.

"The natives could not make it out at all. They were irritated about her conduct. 'She no sick; she no complain; she no nothing, and then she go die one times.' The native philosophy said: 'She done witch herself'—her own 'familiar' had turned upon her."

This is merely false induction; for them science, for us superstition, but just as much an induction after the manner of science as the diagnoses of the physician who explains a death as due to paralysis.

If the native himself recognizes the existence of magic in his tribe it is merely because others are using formulas or 'pulling strings' the nature of whose working he does not comprehend, but in whose genuineness he believes; or, perhaps, he himself is one of the individuals who exercises these mysterious forces. So far as he is impressed with the exceptional nature of its claims and workings and of its failure to harmonize with the rest of his world of experience, in so far is it for him magic. No objective phenomenon can be confidently asserted to be magic here, now, forever and for everybody. Whether or not it be magic depends altogether upon whether it harmonizes with the scientific conceptions of this individual or of that group at the time when they severally react upon these phenomena. Thus, what was once magic or superstition may and does in some cases become verified fact or scientific hypothesis; while what was once science will be relegated to the realm of magic. For science is a process as well as a product, a method as well as a result, and magic is merely discarded or tentative science.

"The Fijians believe there is spiritualism (*luve ui nvai*) in circuses; it is no use denying it, they won't believe you. They seem to suspect the white man forbids *luve ui nvai* so as to reserve the monopoly to himself." (Hocart, in *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1912.)

The peasant, too, will call it magic if he thinks it transcends the laws of the natural world.

The examples of a recent writer on Kafir ethnology, who recognises that what is 'magic' is wholly a relative matter depending on the culture of the two groups concerned and the standpoint of the observer and classifier, are worth quoting:

"It cannot be too clearly stated that the savage regards magic as no more supernatural than such a thing as the rising of the sun, or the growing of the crops, or the falling of a stone to the earth. Magic is no more supernatural than is the electrical dynamo, though it may pass the wit of a plough-boy to conceive how the cunning machine works. The machine may be beyond the comprehension of the lad, who does not, however, imagine that it therefore works by supernatural forces, for he is aware that it was made by men who know more about the laws of this strange universe than he does. In the eyes of the Kafir, the diviner is simply a cunning man who understands, better than ordinary people, the inner working of nature. It follows, as a matter of course, that the diviner can use forces for the service of man in ways that pass the understanding of ordinary folk." (Dudley Kidd, *Kafir Socialism*, p. 21.)

In his book on *Savage Childhood* (p. 48), Mr. Kidd speaks to the same effect. The Kafirs, he tells us, have a belief that the eating of two things closely associated with each other, such, for example, as two mice caught at the same time in one trap, will be conducive to the procreation of twins by the partaker of such fare. "There is, of course," Mr. Kidd says, "nothing magical about the matter; the Kafirs regard such things as much in the same ordinary course of nature as the rising and setting of the sun."

Ellis is not far from the truth when he says: "These . . . superstitions are examples of how the native seeks to find an explanation for every occurrence. To him there is no such thing as accident." (*Ewe-Speaking Peoples*, p. 98.) His superstitions are his causal explanations, no less tentative science because crude and inadequate, reflecting his own cultural limitations.

In modern medicine itself we are not altogether free from these crude views. "Although the medicinal aspect of treatment has come more and more to the front, in no part of the world can the magical aspect be said to have altogether disappeared." (C. S. Myers, Art. on "Disease and Medicine" in Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. IV, p. 724.) Sir William Osler's assurances are to the same effect:

"The battle against polypharmacy, or the use of a large number of drugs (of the action of which we know little, yet we put them into bodies of the

action of which we know less) has not been fought to a finish." (*Aequanimitas—Medicine in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 268.)

Is not such a polypharmacy merely magic of the more respectable type? How, indeed, shall we call such a belief (as that of the Kafirs) magical except by way of comparing it with our own scientific conception?

We have referred in another paper to the use made by magic of the unusual, the foreign, the strange. In this connection, the magical potency attaching to certain foreign objects in Australia is a good case in point. Here we find that the everyday ornament of one tribe, which at home has no magical attributes, when it has strayed off into some other tribe not too familiar with its native use, becomes an object of great magical value. In their recent work on Australia Spencer and Gillen (*Across Australia*, 1912, Vol. II, pp. 350-1) offer the following facts with regard to the magical potency of these foreign objects:

"Every tribe," they say, "has a particular dread of magic connected with a distant place. It is something that they know nothing about, and is therefore more or less uncanny. The Kaitish use an apparatus called Nakitja which they obtain from tribes far out to the West. It consists of a chipped quartzite spear-head with a small lump of resin to which human hair string is attached, and is supposed to be very strongly endowed with evil magic.

"Amongst the Kaitish, Warramunga, and northern tribes generally, a very potent form of evil magic, called 'mauia,' is supposed to be associated with certain little stones. The latter are only actually procured and endowed with their evil magic by members of the Worgaia and Gnanji tribes, who call the magic 'maringilitha,' but they are traded away south as far as the Kaitish tribe, and members of the latter will occasionally use mania when they desire to injure an Arunta man. . . .

"A still more curious case of the influence of foreign magic is associated with what, from its form, may be called a knout. It consists of from thirty to sixty strands of string, made from vegetable fibre, and every Arunta man carries at least one of these about with him, wrapped up out of sight in his wallet. The one and only object of the knout, as used by the Arunta, is to frighten the women. It is believed by the latter to be endowed with strong magic, and the very sight of it is quite enough to bring an erring woman to a sense of what is right and proper—that is, to make her obey her husband. Its magic is potent because it belongs to a distant place. When we got amongst the more northern tribes, such as the Warramunga, we found identically the same implement used by the men as a waist girdle. In these tribes it is in no way whatever associated with magic, and is merely

an ordinary article of everyday wear. There is no difference of any kind between the girdle of the Warramunga and the knout of the Arunta man; in fact, the latter is simply one of these girdles which has been 'sung' in the far north and then traded down south in return for some such object as perhaps a Churinga which the northerners do not have."

The examples of precipitate fear which have been mentioned in our previous paper may be supplemented by the following instance with regard to the Bulu of the Kamerun:

"Having unpacked the organ I set it on the porch while they all stood on the ground below. The tension of suspense during the slow progress of preparation was a test of endurance. At last, everything being ready, I sat down at the organ, filled the bellows, and amidst profound silence suddenly sounded a loud chord. Instantly the crowd bolted. Nothing was to be seen but disappearing legs." (R. H. Milligan, *Fetish Folk of West Africa*, p. 72.)

Also (p. 122):

"Magic is their easy explanation of everything they do not understand. A match (until they become accustomed to it) will scatter a crowd as quickly as a Gatling gun. It is the supernatural of which they are most afraid; as with us, those who believe in ghosts are more afraid of them than the worst of living enemies." (Fang.)

And (p. 123):

"All things in our possession of which they did not know the use were regarded as fetishes. I wore glasses when studying. One day at Efulen I came out of the house with the glasses on. A group of women were standing in front of the house; and several of them, seeing me look at them through the glasses, fell flat on the ground; whereupon I discovered that they supposed my glasses were a fetish by which I might (as one of them said) turn them into monkeys."

Milligan says, further (pp. 130-131):

"All worldly prosperity in Africa depends upon the possession of proper fetishes. They are therefore quick to conclude that we have very powerful fetishes; and it is inevitable that before long they should conclude that the Bible is the missionary's fetish. At Efulen, among the Bulu, when we had been there but a short time, a band of men, setting out upon the war-path with their guns upon their shoulders marched up to our hill and asked if we would give them a Bible to take with them to make their guns shoot straight and procure their success. One day Dr. Good missed a Bible. It had been stolen. He heard nothing of it for a month; after which he was one day walking through a native village where the people, expecting to go

to war next day, were preparing a very powerful fetish or 'war-medicine' by boiling together in a pot several of their most reliable fetishes, and in the boiling pot he found his Bible." (Fang.)

Also (p. 219):

"The superstition of the horseshoe has been so eagerly embraced by the Negro that most people seem to think that it originated with him. It is precisely like many of his own superstitions, and it shows that ignorance and superstition in Africa are like ignorance and superstition anywhere else, and that the African mind is essentially like our own."

We come now to the question of the relation between magic and religion.

In a previous paper (see the JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY, July, 1912) we tried to show that, with few exceptions, "things new or unusual, being unknown, are objects of dread in the degree that mystery invests them;" that they are sometimes interpreted as magic and sometimes as religion; that we cannot tell merely from the nature of the unusual occurrence itself whether it will be looked upon as magical or religious, the workings of the devil or the manifestation of deity; that, if this be true, out of different attitudes toward or different interpretations of these several phenomena may come magic or may come religion; and that, if this be admitted, it follows there is a close and intimate connection between magic and religion. We must remember, however, the meanings for working purposes which we have attached to magic and religion in the preceding paragraphs, for otherwise we should surely find ourselves 'upon the consideration of names huddle up a gallimanfry of diverse articles.'

Among the sacred places of the Pima is

"Hāhātesumichīn or Hāhātai s'mailūsk, Stones Strike, . . . a large block of lava located in the eastern Santan hills. The largest pictograph ever seen by the writer in the Southwest is cut upon it and two or three tons of small angular stones foreign to the locality are piled before it. It is regarded with reverence by the Pimas, who still place offerings of beads, bits of cloth, and twigs of the creosote bush at the foot of the large pictograph." Many of their sacred places seem to answer to the category of the unknown. Indeed, a whole class of inclosures to which respect is shown "are called ōuamūksk, meaning unknown. Beads are to be found strewn about all of them." (26th Ann. Rep. Bur. Amer. Ethnol., p. 254.)

The sense of "deep mystery in the wind, since it was intangible and visible only its effects" that Dr. Wissler attributes

to the Dakota Sioux, is sufficient to invest it with magical or religious significance for these people. (*J. Amer. Folklore*, 1905.)

Fewkes says that with the Zuñi the power of flight was "regarded as magical since it was incomprehensible." (*Amer. Anthropol.*, 1910, N. S., 12, p. 582). In our previous paper we suggested that such incomprehensibility might be accountable for the sacredness of the vulture in Egypt, as Petrie suggests, and for the sacredness of the frigate-bird in Melanesia. We also mentioned that the sacredness or magical properties attributed to albino animals might be the result of the unusualness of absence of pigmentation coupled with its incomprehensibility. Thus—in line with the examples cited in the paper on "The Element of Fear in Religion"—among the Kafirs milk from a cow which has a white belly is a cure for 'worms.' "It is said to be essential that the cow should have no dark-coloured hairs on the under surface of its body." (Dudley Kidd, *Savage Childhood*, p. 40.) But albinism is now of magical now of religious significance. For example, on the West Coast of Africa, though the writer knows of no reference to albino animals, we find the sacredness attaching to albino humans. At Moree, in Ashanti, they are sacred to the so-called god, Ayufwa, "and, on arriving at puberty, become her priests and priestesses. They are regarded by the people as the mouthpieces of the goddess; their directions are implicitly obeyed, and in former days an albino had only to indicate a man or woman as one whose death Ayufwa desired, and the immediate immolation of the victim ensued." (A. B. Ellis, *Tshi-Speaking Peoples*, p. 49.)

Milligan says that among the Mpongwe and the Fang of the Gaboon district "the albino is an abhorrence." Among the Pawnee, the skin of an albino buffalo calf had magical power.

On the other hand, the unusual may inspire fear uncoupled with respect. In the Euahlayi tribe of Australia, to cite some cases in point, a child born with teeth is known thereby not to have an earthly father and is not allowed to live. (Parker, *Euahlayi*, p. 51.)

According to Bandin (*Fetichism, etc.*, p. 66) "at Whydah, on the West Coast of Africa, an infant who had been born with teeth was thrown into

the lagoon." The reason assigned by the fetich-priests was that "the child was the father of the reigning king, who had come back to earth."

There can be little doubt that this was rather the *post facto* explanation rather than the ulterior reason.

Ellis informs us—

"According to local report at Whydah a child that was born with teeth at Agbomi, about 1883, was thrown into the sea at Whydah by order of the king, because the Buko-no declared that it was animated by the soul of the preceding monarch." (*Ewe-Speaking Peoples*, p. 116.)

Similarly, on the Gold Coast:

"Children born with supernumerary fingers or toes were often strangled or burnt alive, and when several children had been lost by a family, the body of the last that died was often cast into the bush, and any deformity possessed by a subsequent child, whose body they believed to be the same as the one cast into the bush, was attributed to the bodily injuries that the dead child had received from the wild animals of the forest." (MacDonald, *Gold Coast*, p. 197.) A Ceylon child born with hair and teeth is usually killed as the offspring of a demon father. (*Indian Antiq.*, xxvii, p. 19.)

Likewise, an unusual behavior on the part of animals will inspire the same emotional attitude. Thus, among the Euahlayi of whom we spoke above:

If, during the night, a gilah flies over the camp 'crying out as it passes,' or a magpie, or a cawing crow, the child must be turned to escape the evil consequences of 'debbil debbil.' "As these birds are not night birds, it is evident they are evil spirits abroad in bird form, hence the precautions." (K. P. Parker, *Euahlayi*, p. 53.)

It is probable that the Africans are not without the same reactions if we may accept the suggestion contained in one of the animal tales reported from British Central Africa, where, according to A. Werner, an Anyanja story relates the fright of Elephant upon seeing Hare, stripped of his skin, and with rattles tied to his legs, dancing in front of the hut where Elephant was eating. (A. Werner, *British Central Africa*, p. 237.) The fright of Elephant may, of course, have some other explanation—though the story implies no other—or it may not express to the native mind the cause and effect relation which it seems to express. Solution of these particular problems must, of

course, be left to the field-worker; but he seems little prone to take up new problems until they are clearly formulated in his own mind. The suggestions of others may do much toward this end. To make possible and probable more intensive and intelligent studies in the field along the line of the problems suggested above, would, we are convinced, be the greatest justification for the attempt which we have made to present the problems of magic and religion and clarify our conceptions concerning them. We should continually aim to formulate the problems so that later ethnological research along suggested lines could actually extend our knowledge of the psychology of the savage.

Dr. Edward Sapir writes me with regard to the Nootka:

"The Nootka word *tc'li Hä* means not only spirit or *ghost* but also anything unusual or uncanny, such as a bug which is rarely seen, or even an elephant, if one has never or rarely seen it before."

The fear of the unusual is expressed in the following Eskimo tale:

"At one of their banquets an inlander stood forth, and by way of entertaining the assembly, he sang and danced. During the dance he transformed himself into a reindeer; but at this trick the children of the innarutligaks got dreadfully frightened, so that he again quickly changed himself into a man. Another, in his turn to divert the company, took upon himself the shape of a hare, but the inlanders' children cried out aloud, and he hastened to re-change himself as fast as possible. One inlander, when he danced, pulled the skin from off his whole body till it only adhered to a small portion between his eyes; but when the urchins cried, he soon put it all right again." (Rink, p. 219.)

Take this rather picturesque account of West Africa:

"Then Nzambi Mjunga returned to them, and said: 'My friend, how can I know that you have really come from the ruler of the earth, and that you are not impostors?'

"'Nay,' they said; 'put us to some test that we may prove our sincerity to you.'

"'I will,' said Nzambi Mjunga 'go down to this earth of your, and bring me a bundle of bamboos, that I may make myself a shed.'

"And the tortoise went down, leaving the others where they were, and soon returned with the bamboos.

"Then Nzambi Mjunga said to the rat: 'Get thee beneath this bundle of bamboos, and I will set fire to it. Then if thou escape I shall surely know that Nzambi sent you.'

"And the rat did as he was bidden. And Nzambi Mjungu set fire to the bamboos, and lo! when they were entirely consumed, the rat came from amidst the ashes unharmed.

"Then he said: 'You are indeed what you represent yourself to be. I will go and consult my people again.' " (R. E. Dennett, *Folklore of the Fjort*, p. 75.)

Tregear gives a good instance of the demand for the marvellous and miraculous as proof of the genuineness of one's divine mission. Bishop Selwyn paid a visit to Te Heuheu, one of the greatest of New Zealand chiefs.

"Almost all New Zealand had adopted the new religion and, of all the notables, Te Heuheu was the only remaining heathen. To be defied by a single man piqued the brave missionary-bishop, who resolved to visit and convert this last worshipper of the old gods. Te Heuheu received his guest with all due ceremony, and when a space of time sufficient for courtesy has expired, the Bishop told his errand. He said that he was an ambassador from God, and that he wished to bring the chief the knowledge of true religion. Te Heuheu answered, 'I am a god myself. I can recite my pedigree. It comes directly from Heaven, my father, from Earth, my mother (that is, from Rangi and Papa).' 'I do not speak,' said the Bishop, 'of such gods as these; I mean the Creator of all things, the Judge of all men of the last day.' 'If,' answered the Maori, 'you are the messenger and priest of a god, show me a miracle, give me a sign as a credential.' The Bishop answered, 'My Master refused to give a sign, and I have none to give. The sign of my religion is in the life of a man, in the changed and justified heart.' 'My priest here,' said Te Heuheu, 'has power from his god to work wonders. Give a sign and he shall give greater.' The Bishop again refused. The Maori beckoned to the *tohunga*, Hunnaho, who was standing near. 'Show the stranger priest a sign,' he said. The *tohunga* moved forward and picked up a brown and faded leaf that had fallen from a cabbage-palm overhead. 'Here,' he said to the Bishop, 'make this dead leaf green again.' 'No,' replied the Bishop, 'I cannot do so, nor can you, nor any living man.' 'No!' exclaimed the priest, 'see!' And he tossed the brown strip high in the air. It wavered downwards to the earth, green as grass. 'Can you not do as much?' said the chief to the Bishop. 'No,' I have already answered you,' said the Bishop. 'Then,' said Te Heuheu, 'your gods are weaker than mine, I will not hearken.' The Bishop had to leave Te Heuheu unconverted.'" (*Maori*, p. 519.)

Among the Peruvians, according to Dorman, "a man struck by lightning was considered as chosen by heaven."

Is it necessary to point out how like this is to the way of crediting divine messengers which we find applied both by cult

after cult and by those individuals whom we recognize as religiously inclined'? One is reminded of the passage in the *Légende des Siècles*:

There fell a drop of blood.
Canute drew back trembling to be alone,
And wished he had not left his burial couch.
But, when a blood-drop fell again, he stopp'd,
Stoop'd his pale head, and tried to make a prayer.
Then fell a drop, and the prayer died away
In savage terror. Darkly he moved on,
A hideous spectre hesitating, white,
And ever as he went a drop of blood
Implacably from the darkness broke away
And stained that awful whiteness. He beheld
Shaking, as doth a poplar in the wind,
Those stains grow darker and more numerous:
Another, and another, and another.
They seem to light up that funereal gloom,
And mingling in the folds of that white sheet,
Made it a cloud of blood. He went, and went,
And still from that unfathomable vault
The red blood dropped upon him drop by drop,
Always, forever—without noise, as though
From the black feet of some night-gibbeted corpse.
Alas! Who wept those formidable tears?
The Infinite!

From Knowlson's *Origins of Popular Superstitions* may be quoted two instances: the first an instance of magic or superstition, which would be excluded by deliberately making one's self more rigidly scientific; the second an example of religious significance passing away because of later scientific explanation of the phenomena. We juxtapose them by way of giving better opportunity to compare. After considering both instances, we may ask whether there is anything in the nature of the case which makes the first magical, the second religious, and whether it might not easily happen that the same phenomena, under slightly differing circumstances and interest, should exchange significance, the magical becoming religious, the religious becoming magical. If we answer affirmatively the close connection between magic and religion in at least certain circumstances is admitted.

In the first instance, the author, after citing a host of super-

stitutions about trivial things believed to insure success on the stage, gives the following explanation:

"The omens and mascots of stage life have their source in the artistic temperament. We do not find these superstitions in the life of the music-hall artist, at least not in the same degree; and whilst the actor-manager of a theatre might have some scruples for the superstitions of the profession, the manager of a music hall would have none at all, because he faces business on a purely business basis. Now, that is the difference between the actor-man and the commercial-man; the former has to deal with a crowd of uncertainties—the fickleness of the public, the machinery of the stage, the health of the troupe, lapses of memory, and a score of other items equally trying. Add to this the constant endeavour to *act* a picture in his own mind, or to *interpret* a part in a classic drama, and you have a psychology full of weird possibilities in its conclusions. Viewed from this standpoint, the actor's superstitions are to some extent natural; were he not of the artistic temperament he would be lacking the sympathy his art requires." (*Origins of Popular Superstitions*, p. 228.)

The contrasting example:

"The eye of the Papist was ever on the look out for signs and portents of grace in the realm of Nature and material things. A good instance of this is found in the old notion of the shaking aspen. Christ is alleged to have been crucified on aspen wood, and from that time the boughs of aspen trees 'have been filled with horror and trembled ceaselessly.' Unfortunately for the probability of this story, the shivering of the aspen in the breeze may be traced to other than supernatural cause. The construction of its foliage is particularly adapted for motion: a broad leaf is placed upon a long foot stalk, so flexible as scarcely to be able to support the leaf in an upright posture; the upper part of this stalk, on which the play or action seems mainly to depend, is contrary to the nature of foot stalks in general, being perfectly flattened, and as an eminent botanist has acutely observed, is placed at a right angle with the leaf, being thus particularly fitted to receive the impulse of every wind that blows." (*Ibid.*, p. 7.)

In a recent review of Stratton in the *International Journal of Ethics* for October, 1912 (p. 90), Professor Leuba restates his conception of religion in these words:

"The deeper aspect of religion—because the deeper aspect of life—is in my opinion a desire for, and an attempt to secure things that are valued. . . . To be religious is better defined, in my opinion, as *entering into or standing in dynamic relation* with an unseen hyperhuman company because of one's appreciation of this relation."

Surely such a view will not always ring consistent with the distinction made between magic and religion in the *Psychological Study of Religion*, where religion is defined as social and

beneficial, and magic as individual and evil. The following instance of Eskimo shamanism will answer the definition of religion as given in the two sentences quoted above, but will fail to meet the requirements of the definition as given in the *Psychological Study*. Indeed, by his own various definitions the following facts represent both religion and magic. Such instances could be multiplied, but a solitary one will serve as effectually as a score. In Eskimo land—

“In the practice of *iliseenek*, or witchcraft, a power was applied to which was superior to mankind; and we might thus be led to suppose that this power represented an evil being or ruler in opposition to *tornarsuk* [the ‘supreme ruler’]. Some mystical tradition is related by Egede, mentioning two men engaged in dispute, one desiring man to be subjected to death, and the other insisting upon his becoming immortal. The words spoken by them may perhaps be considered as magic spells, and the one of them is represented as having made death enter into the world. This legend is rather obscure, both with regard to its authenticity and its meaning; but the idea of death was closely connected with that of witchcraft, this latter always more or less having death for its aim. Sickness or death coming about in an unexpected manner was always ascribed to witchcraft; and it remains a question whether death on the whole was not originally accounted for as resulting from it. The fact that witches were punished as transgressors of human laws, and were persecuted by the *angakut*, makes it possible that they represent the last remains of a still more primitive faith, which prevailed before the *angakut* sprang up and made themselves acknowledged as the only mediators between mankind and the invisible rulers of the world. These primitive religious notions may in that case have amounted to a belief in certain means being capable of acting on the occult powers of nature, and through them on the conditions of human life. Traces of the same belief were perhaps also preserved among the people in the shape of some slight acquaintance with the medical art, and superstitions regarding amulets, the knowledge of which was peculiar to women. And allowing this supposition, we shall find the most striking analogy between the persecution of witches by the *angakut* and the persecution of the *angakut* by the Christian settlers, with this exception, that the Christian faith exhibits a personification of the evil principle which enabled the missionaries to vanquish forever the authority of *tornarsuk* as the supreme ruler and source of benefits, by transforming him into the Christian devil, who for this reason henceforth was termed *tornarsuk*.” (H. Rink, *Tales and Traditions of the Eskimo*, pp. 41-2.)

Here we have at once a magic that answers the description of individual and evil and a religion that may be defined—in the author’s words—“as entering into or standing in dynamic relation with an unseen hyperhuman company because of one’s appreciation of this relation.” (*Op. cit.*)

To say that by magic I mean a certain thing—something individual and evil—and by religion a certain thing—something social and beneficial—and then to use these definitions as justifying a distinction of this kind, is to argue in a small circle. By such a method magic must ever be opposed to religion because by definition we make it so, just as when you collect your facts under this designation as a means of recognition they will in their *ensemble* express the distinction by virtue of which you gathered them together. But this will not solve or help to solve the question whether the phenomena from which magic develops is like or different from the phenomena out of which religion develops. It may be, for example, that the same group of phenomena gives rise now to magic, now to religion. As the one tendency will never be the other, and as by our definition we have made them mutually exclusive, it will never appear by such a formal treatment that the two are inter- or genetically related. Nor can we by that means ever disprove such connection. Not to distinguish would be to identify; to suppose that the distinction because it exists implies lack of historical and genetic relationship would be poor discrimination, partial insight and worse logic.

It may be objected that we are making an unwarranted distinction: religion, it will be said, is a complex, now social, now emotional, now intellectual, a complex out of which no single component element can be analysed. Of magic, too, the same will be said. This is, of course, true. There are situations of almost every conceivable complexity called now religion, now magic. It would be unjustifiable to introduce method or conceptions that would interfere with an impartial treatment of these situations on their own merits. At the same time, when we say that we can not define magic or religion, we must attach some meaning to the terms which we employ. If our meaning is merely a denotative one in which we refer to certain complexes, how are we to know what complexes should be so denoted? In short, I do not see how we can use these terms without attaching some meaning to them, and it remains to see what that meaning is. Here again, of course, the terminology is of no importance except to help us to understand the various social complex situations in their respective relations and compositions.

To a large extent, history and general assent identify certain situations as religion or religious, others as magic or magical.

We may, by analysis, try to discover whether there is a common element in most of these and whether a labeling of certain defined situations will help us to our goal through a simplification of the difficulties. Religion, for example, is certainly a social phenomenon; so likewise is magic, and so everything else that takes on any proportions. But what is characteristic of religious phenomena, and what is characteristic of magical phenomena? What shall guide us in distinguishing the one from the other even where we identify?

These, we venture to believe, are important problems in an investigation of religion or of magic, and upon an adequate treatment of them the success of the undertaking must ultimately depend. At present, it seems, effort must be tentative; yet even inefficient effort may help to make the problems clearer, accentuate—if only slightly—the distinctions, and furnish guide posts that will help a later investigator. That investigator, we venture to suggest, will find among various peoples phenomena that have now the ritualistic phase (as, for example, the Todas and the Pueblos), now the prayer phase (as, for example, the Fox), and so on, in a pronounced degree without the other elements usually associated with religious activities. So far as he seeks for psychological origin and motives we believe they will center around the mysterious as the distinguishing religious emotion, qualified, of course, by the social conditions and the cult activities in which it finds expression.

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THE PITFALL: AN OLD WORLD FOLK-LORE CYCLE

By ALBERT NICOLAY GILBERTSON, A. M.,

Fellow in Anthropology, Clark University, Worcester, Mass.

One of the foremost folklorists of northern Europe is Moltke Moe, professor in the University of Christiania. He has inherited his love for ancient tales, for he is the son of Bishop J r gen Moe, the Norwegian poet and churchman, who devoted his earlier life to the collection of the rich folk-lore of his native land. His co-worker in this laudable undertaking was Peter Christian Asbj rnsen. Together they published a series of these tales, many of which have been translated into English by Sir G. W. Dasent in his *Popular Tales from the Norse*. In their original language, this folk-lore has been brought to America by the Norwegian immigrants, who, with their descendants, form such a large and influential part of our population, especially in the great Northwest. It was in a Norwegian settlement in Minnesota that, as a child, the writer heard the tale which forms the subject of this paper. And it is to the researches of Professor Moltke Moe that we owe the study, of which it is here attempted to give an account. The tales here given are translated from the version in Nordahl Rolfsen's *L esebog for Folkeskolen*, 5te Del, from which the accompanying comments by Professor Moe are also taken.

In speaking of the migrations of folk-tales, our authority says:

“We know that in Scandinavia foreign coins have been found in the earth, not only English, German, and French coins, but also Greek and Roman, yes even Arabian and Phoenician. How have these coins come to us? As a rule, not by there having been people from so distant southern lands here in the north in those remote times, nor people from here down there. In most cases it is the coins themselves that have traveled, gone from hand to hand through one country after another. So it is with the different kinds of animals; they too have migrated. The cat came to southern Europe sixteen or seventeen hundred years ago, and to northern Europe much later than that. The rat came early in the Middle Ages, and the common brown rat reached Norway only at the beginning of the nineteenth century. . . .

“So folk-tales likewise travel, many of them, from mouth to mouth, from land to land. There are not a few tales which one soon sees are

foreign. But there are also tales which no one can see are of foreign origin. We are surprised to hear that they are immigrants—we all feel that they are native to the soil, just as we now do about cats and rats.”

The following is one of the most popular of Norse tales. Its Norwegian title, the reason for which will appear in the story, is “*Han far sjöl i stua*” (Dano-Norwegian, “*Selve faderen i stuen*,” literally, “The very father in the house”), which may perhaps be rendered, in colloquial English, as “The old man of the house.” The colloquial language and idiomatic style cannot be properly presented in a translation.

Once upon a time there was a man who lived in a forest; he had many sheep and goats, but he could never have peace from the ravages of the wolf. “I will fool him,” he said at last, and took to digging a wolf-pit. When he had dug deep enough, he put a post right down in the center of the pit, and on the post he nailed a board, and on the board he put a little dog, and over the pit he laid brushwood and on top of that he strewed snow, so that the wolf would not see that there was a pit underneath. As night wore on, the little dog became tired of standing there. “Bow, wow-wow!” it said, and barked at the moon. Then a fox came along, and he thought he would make a good catch, and so jumped—and plump, into the wolf-pit. As the night wore on still more, the little dog became very weary and very hungry, and so it took to barking and whining. “Bow-wow-wow!” it said. Just then a wolf came along; he thought he would get a fat roast, and so he jumped—plump, into the pit. As day-break drew near the north-wind began to blow, and it became so cold that the little dog stood freezing and shivering, and it was so tired and hungry. “Bow-wow-wow-wow!” it said and barked away continually. Then a bear came ambling along, and he thought that he would get a good bite for breakfast; so onto the twigs he went—plump into the pit.

In the morning, an old beggar-woman came walking along, with a bag on her back. When she spied the little dog, which stood there and barked, she had to go over and see if any animals had come into the pit during the night. She lay down on her knees and peeped down into the pit.

“Have you come in the trap now, Michael?”¹ she said to the fox, for she saw him first, “good enough for you, you hen-thief? And you too, Graybrush!” she said to the wolf; “you’ve rent many a goat and sheep, now you’ll be killed at last. Ah me, Bruin, do you too sit there in the pit, you mare-flayer? We’ll flay you and nail your skull on the store-house wall!” the woman shouted eagerly and shook her fist at the bear; but just then the bag fell forward over her head, and the woman fell—plump, into the pit. So they sat there and stared at each other, all four, each in his corner: the fox in one, the wolf in another, the bear in the third, and the woman in the fourth corner.

But when it was full daylight, Michael began to stir and move about, for he likely thought he might be able to get out. But the woman said:

¹ Norwegian “Mikkel,” a name for the fox, like our “Reynard.”

"Can't you sit still, you wag-tail, and not go wandering about? Just look at the old man of the house, he sits as staid as a priest!"—for she thought she would try to make friends with the bear. But the man came, who owned the wolf-pit. First he pulled the woman out, and then killed all the animals, and he spared neither the old man of the house nor Graybrush nor Michael wag-tail. That night he thought he had made a good catch.

Professor Moe adds:

"The first time I heard this tale out in a country district, I thought: 'This must be Norse, just as Norse as the vigorous rustic speech up here.' And the eighty-years old woman who told me the tale, with quivering mouth and swaying head, yet with a clearness and certainty, as if she was just now living through what she was telling,—her lowly cottage, where there was not as much as a table to write on, where I sat on the only stool there was, and wrote on my knees (she herself sat on the hearth-stone)—the steep hillside below, the summer day out-of-doors, that quivered over the valley, with blue mist over the mountains farthest away—all strengthened my belief: If anything is Norse, this is.

"But then I find it in a Buddhist book from India, a book twelve to fifteen hundred years old—the same tale, only here just as Indian as ours is Norse."

Our author points out that in antiquity and in the early part of the Middle Ages there was lively intercourse between India and western Asia and southern Europe, not only through trade, but also through literary channels. In the period beginning with Alexander the Great, much of Greek literature and science was known and appreciated in India. Later much of the Indian literature was translated into other languages, especially Persian; then from Persian to Arabic or Syriac, and thence to Greek and Latin and other European languages. In Old Norse, there is a book, called "*Barla'am and Josaphat's Saga*," which has been translated from tongue to tongue, and which originally is a story of the life of Buddha. Likewise the journeyings of "*Han far sjöl i stua*" may be traced throughout Asia and in many parts of Europe. The following is a Tibetan version:

Many long ages ago, when Bramadatta was king, a man went into the forest with ax and basket to fetch wood. There he came upon a lion. He took to his heels,—the lion after him. The wood-cutter fell headlong into a pit; and so did the lion after him. Then a mouse came running with a serpent after it; up in the air was a falcon that saw them and wanted to take the mouse away from the serpent. But all three went into the pit. And the lion said: "Now we are all in the same need and the same grief; therefor none of us shall do the others any harm. Be not afraid;—you are my friends; sit in quiet and security."

Then a hunter came that way. He peeped down into the grave, and all the animals cried: "Help us!" And the hunter helped them. First he pulled up the lion, and it crouched before him, rubbed itself against his legs, and said: "I will remember you! But do not save the man with the black head; he will forget."—The lion departed. And the hunter pulled them up, one after the other; also the man with the black head.

One day the hunter came again to the same place. There stood the lion with a gazelle, which it had killed. And it rubbed itself against his legs and gave him the gazelle.

Some time later King Bramadatta went out in the park with all his wives. One of them lost her jewels,—while she lay and rested the falcon came flying, took the jewels, and carried them to the hunter. The queen told it to the king, and the king sent out people to hunt for them. When the man with the black head heard of that, he went right to the king, and said that he had seen the jewels in the possession of the hunter. The hunter said that the falcon had given them to him; but that did not avail; he was bound and cast in prison. Then the mouse went to the serpent and told what the man with the black head had done. The serpent crawled to the hunter and said: "I will go to the king and bite him a little. Then you can come afterward and make him well; here is a charm which you can use." And thus it happened, the serpent crawled to the king and bit him, and the hunter came and made him well. Then the king became so glad, that he released the hunter and knew not all the good he would like to do for him.

Now compare this Tibetan folk-tale with one recorded from Europe in the Middle Ages. Its narrator is none less than King Richard Coeur de Lion, of England. It is as follows:

Once upon a time there was a rich, but greedy man in Venice, named Vitalis. He was going to give away his daughter in marriage; therefore he went hunting to procure game for the wedding table. The forest was dense and wild, the zeal of the chase possessed him, and before he knew it, he went headlong into an animal pit. There he found a lion and a large snake, which had also fallen into the pit and could not get out again; the pit was too deep. Vitalis made the sign of the cross, nor did the animals molest him; but he had to stay in the pit the whole night and the next day, even though he shouted and cried for help. But it so happened, that a poor wood-cutter heard the cries and came over to the pit and asked what was the matter. "My name is Vitalis," said the Venetian, "I did not know of this animal pit, and now I am afraid that I shall be devoured by these beasts, unless hunger puts an end to me first. Pull me up; thou shalt not regret that: I will give thee half of all I possess." And that he swore to, and called upon God as a witness. While they were speaking, the lion wagged its tail, hopped and danced, and the serpent hissed and curved, as if they both wanted to ask for help, just as did Vitalis.—The wood-cutter ran home after ladder and rope, which he let down in the pit. The ladder had no sooner reached the bottom, before the lion and serpent crawled up, and when they were saved, they went round about the wood-cutter, as if they wished to thank him and show him how glad they

were. Thereupon he helped Vitalis, and when Vitalis came so high that he could take the hand of the poor man, he kissed it and wished it all good things in thanks. Before they parted, the wood-cutter asked: "When will you give me that which you promised me?" "In four days," said Vitalis, "come to me in Venice; everybody knows my house; it is not difficult to find."

The wood-cutter went home. As he sat and had his meal, the lion came carrying a roe-calf which it gave him; and the lion danced round about him and licked his feet. It wanted the wood-cutter to go with it, so he might see where it had its den. When the poor man had come home again, the snake came; it carried a jewel in its mouth and laid it on the man's plate. And it went the same way; the snake put on friendly airs, and the man went with it and saw where it had its nest.

On the fourth day the wood-cutter took the jewel with him and went to Venice. There he found Vitalis, who was just having a feast, to celebrate his safe return home. The wood-cutter called him out, and asked him if he was going to do as he had promised. "Who are you?" said Vitalis, "what do you want?" "You promised me half of all you possess, you remember that, don't you?" said the wood-cutter, "and swore to it." "Just listen to him! Do you think you'll get rich so easily? I have toiled and tugged a long time, have I," said Vitalis. And then he called to his men, that they should take this beggar and put him in the dungeon.—The wood-cutter knew then, what kind of people he had come to, and fled as fast as he could. He went right to the authorities and told everything, just as it had happened. This sounded incredible; but he showed the jewel he had got from the snake, and got some people with him to the lion's den and the snake's nest. And when they saw how the animals acted toward him, they understood that he was telling the truth. And so Vitalis was sentenced to pay what he had promised, and more too.

To quote Professor Moe:

"We see at once that these two foreign folk-tales are closely related and are distinct from the Norse. And yet they all resemble each other. In all there is a human being and some animals that fall into a pit. But the Norwegian tale deals with this happening alone. In the other two there is a long story after that, about how *animals are grateful*, while *human beings are ungrateful*. And that is a thought which originated with the Indians, and which they relate a hundred different ways in their writings.

"But that is not the way we think, we do not believe that animals are always so much more grateful than men. And people up here somehow felt, when they heard a tale like that by Richard Coeur de Lion, that it sounded rather foreign and strange. And so they made the tale over, so that they got it to fit into the life and doings here at home, into the views and modes of thoughts of our people. In other words: our people have re-created the folk-tale in their own image. . . . In this way it is true and real, this homely impression which we got from the tale 'Han far sjöl i stua.' The material, the stuff, is foreign, and has by long routes reached here from India. . . . But the fashioning and transforming—that, and

that alone, constitutes the work of literary art. And can one think of anything more Norse than the description of the crackling cold winter night, the howling dog, the skulking wild beasts, or the dry raillery about the poor beggar woman? It is as if such things cannot die, so tenacious of life do they appear. They can spread out into long stories, increase and extend like a whole forest, and they can shrink, so that they hide in a few words, just like a little dried seed,—but still they *live*. . . . Among the Negroes in Central Africa we find 'Han far sjöl i stua,' adapted and fashioned according to *their* mode of thought, sentiment and life. It is in the world of folk-lore as in nature: the matter is not destroyed, it only changes form and appears in new shapes. Every people and every age has its own,—and we can just as safely call our folk-lore Norse, as the Hollanders call their ship Dutch, even though it is built of Norwegian timber."

The reader will recall that in a quotation given in the early part of this paper, Professor Moe mentions the fact that the brown rat came to Norway only a hundred years ago. But there are Norwegian folk-tales about *rats*; are they then younger than the year 1800? To which question he replies that that need not be the case; they can well be older in the country than are the rats. At first it was not rats, but some other animals that the story told about. Note the change in animal personnel in the above folk-lore cycle with the differing fauna of the countries concerned. Another Norse folk-tale, referred to by our author, is that about "The Master-Thief."¹ He fooled both priest and bailiff (amtmand) and the king himself, and was threatened with the work-house (tugthus). But this story about the master-thief is found in an Egyptian inscription dating from 1500 B. C., and "at that time we know that there were neither work-houses nor bailiffs nor Christian priests." Professor Moe concludes:

"Folk-tales accommodate themselves to the land to which they have come and the time in which they live. . . . They live young and fresh and homely on children's lips, and still they may be two or three thousand years old. It is with them as with the fossils—which the child plays with and the scholar picks up and in it reads the story of milleniums."

¹ Dasent, *Popular Tales from the Norse* (Edinburgh, 1903), pp. 232 ff.

THE "ANTAGONISM" OF CITY AND COUNTRY

BY ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN, PH. D.,
Professor of Anthropology, Clark University, Worcester, Mass.

The "antagonism" between country and city began when the human race was yet young. Oriental legend tells us that Syrian Damascus is the oldest city in the world, and Sir John de Maundeville,⁹ that quaint English traveler of the fourteenth century, in whose writings so much of the strange and marvellous is found, brought back the story that the city was built on the very spot where Cain slew Abel his brother. And down through the ages the "brand of Cain" has, in some fashion or other, clung to urban communities, as is evidenced by many proverbs and sayings in diverse tongues. To Cain even the building of the first city is attributed. The Hebrew Bible (Gen. ii:8) informs us, and it contains some of the most ancient speculations and social concepts of the Semitic peoples, that "God had planted a garden toward the east, in Eden, and there he put the man that he had formed." Here, in all innocence, the Hebrew cosmologist tells us, the race of man began.

Paradise, the name given alike to the dwelling-place of man in the Golden Age of the Past, and to the Heaven whither goes his soul after this life is over, in the Golden Age to come, meant in Hebrew, as also in Persian, whence the term was borrowed, "a garden," and the idea thus expressed finds cognates in the thought of many primitive peoples of both hemispheres. All this, and much more, lies beneath the declaration of the English poet Cowley:

"God the first garden made, and the first city, Cain."

"Gardening," said Sir Francis Bacon, "is the purest of human pleasures," and, as far back as history leads us, we can trace the opinion that simple, country life had born of it, and was permeated with, innocence, virtue and goodness; that only since the Fall was man cognizant of the evils that are inseparably connected with city life.

Yet, it is curious to note the fact,— seeming to show how relative these matters are after all,—that Damascus, though

famed in the Moslem wars for its flawless swords, bestowed upon the world the more peaceful gifts of the *damson* plum and the *damask* rose, and gained for itself the title of the "Garden City,"—a *rus in urbe*, as it were, the ideal of the ancient Roman proverb. Equally paradoxical is it that Cain, whose rejected sacrifice shows him to have been, in the opinion of the writer of the first chapters of the Book of Genesis, the first tiller of the soil, since he brought to the altar the fruits of the fields, should have been reputed the founder of the first city. How the Paradise concept changed with the changing years appears from the presence in the writings of the early Christian Church of the New Jerusalem, a golden-streeted city, with gates of precious stones, wherein the Tree and the Waters of Life almost alone remained of the Eden of the prime.

In Greek mythology we meet, on the one hand, with the Isles of the Blest, the Soul-Garden of the Hesperides, types of a myth held in common with the Celts,—perhaps, as some authorities hold, even borrowed from that imaginative and poetic scion of the Aryan stock, and, on the other, with Olympus, which, as Count d'Alviella¹ points out, was essentially a Greek city, with its Zeus, or tyrant-god; but, since Greece never could be said to have attained a national unity, there were in heaven other tyrannies than that of Zeus—corresponding to the numerous semi-independent communities of Hellas (p. 145). But there are, however, races whose otherworld resembles this, with its contrast, less marked it is true than with us, but present, nevertheless, to some extent of rural and urban ideas, activities and surroundings. Not everywhere do we find the Elysian fields, or the great city of the Gods.

Let us turn for a few moments to philology and see what is its story of the relationship of city and country. What their *language* was to the Greeks, their *city* was to the Latins. *Roma est orbis caput*,—"Rome is the capital of the world,"—writes the poet Ovid, and the civil proclamations of old, like their ecclesiastical successors of later ages were endited *Urbi et orbi*,—"for the city [Rome] and the world." Roman citizenship was esteemed world-citizenship; from the heights of his pride the Roman citizen looked down upon the outer, unenfranchised nations with quite as much contempt as did the Hellenes upon the barbarians to whom their tongue was unknown. And, to judge from the legacy she has left us in language, the citizen-

ship of Rome was, in its beginnings, quite as narrow as the speech-totem of old Greece.

Virgil, in his "Elogues," it will be remembered, speaks of the mention of his native Mantua, after the city of Roma, as "a comparison of great things with small." In the early days of its existence the numerous little villages and hamlets of the Roman territory were known as *pagi* and their inhabitants were termed *pagani*. The latter word meant, at first, nothing more than "villagers," "country-people," but, as the imperial city grew in wealth and intelligence, it assumed a touch of contempt and disdain, which gathered strength with the flight of time, so that when the spirit of militarism was rampant and Rome became the war-power of the world, the patient, hard-working, country-folk, and, after them, all quiet, peace-loving civilians, were styled *pagani*.

Then Christianity came upon the scene, and the old test of citizenship seems to have forced itself upon the ecclesiastical empire, which took the place of the great temporal dominion, that had gone to destruction. Like Paul in Athens, the early advocates of the new religion seem to have sought out the wise men, and in Rome the Christian doctrine seems to have appealed first to the intelligence of the towns and cities of the empire, while in the *pagi* and the country-districts generally, the old beliefs and superstitions lingered long and died hard. Indeed, as Mr. Leland ⁸ has amply shown, they have not even yet been entirely abandoned by the Italian peasantry of to-day. Here we may find many illustrations of the lines of Pope:

"Till Peter's keys some christen'd Love adorn,
And Pan to Moses lend his pagan horn."

It is not surprising, then, to find that in A. D. 368,—less than four centuries after the birth of the new religion,—the Emperor Valentinian applies, in one of his edicts, the term *pagani* to those country- and village-folk who were slow to receive the truths of Christianity. As the years rolled by and one church, whose pontiff dwelt on the banks of Tiber, sought sovereignty over the rest, the term came to be applied to all who were not of the Catholic confession, and if the charm of the Roman citizenship of old had been great, the ban of the new paganism, the outlawry of the church was even greater. Nor did the Reformation of Luther deprive the word of its sting; we even use

it to-day. But the sting grows less and less painful and vindictive. In a "World's Parliament of Religion,"—one of the happiest thoughts of the age,—"pagan" religions have at last received recognition and due representation. Soon, it is to be hoped, the time-old stigma will have disappeared, or linger perhaps, as a term of reproach, among such "civilized" people as the Iroquois Indians of New York and Canada, where those of the tribe who have accepted the Christianity of the white missionaries, term "pagan" their brethren who still cling fast to the faith of their fathers.

There is another Latin word which interests us here. With the Romans the term *gens* (akin to *gigno*, "I produce, beget," and our word *kin*) was applied to "a clan embracing several families united by a common name and origin, and by certain religious rites"; to the inhabitants of a town or city, and also to a race, a nation. In the course of time, when the epithet *Romani* began to be so much esteemed, the rest of the world, strangers, foreigners,—all nations outside of Rome,—came to be called *gentes*, "the nations," in just the same manner as the French Canadian of to-day calls the Indian tribes of central and western Canada *les nations* (nations, *gentes*).

In the early ages of Christianity, the Fathers of the Church took the word *gentes* and applied it to the non-Christian and unconverted people without the pale of the great Church of Rome. The adjective belonging to *gens* is *gentilis*, which, passing through French, has given us our *gentile* [also *gentle*, *gentleel*, *gentle*(man)], and, in our English Bible, is put into the mouths of the Hebrew writers of the New Testament, when nations outside of the Jews are referred to. "Jew and Gentile," mean much the same as "Hellene and Barbarian," "Roman and Pagan." With us, however, in the present century, "gentiles" have almost ceased to be; indeed, the only "gentiles" we commonly hear of are those liberal-minded fellow-citizens of ours who are striving to free Utah from the incubus of polygamy, and to whom their Mormon opponents apply the ancient epithet of despal.

As in Greece and Rome, so with our Teutonic forefathers, the history of a single word is significant. By the orthodox Christianity of the narrower type to-day the many millions who know not, or who reject, the Christ, are termed *heathen*,—a doubtful

exception being made in the case of the Jews and the Moham-medans. But that old English poem *Piers Plowman* tells us:

“*Hethene* is to mene after *heth*
And untilled erthe.”

and, originally, a *heathen* was simply a “dweller on the *heath*.”

Our ancestors, in the pre-Christian centuries, divided the world within their immediate cognizance into two parts, the names of which have come down to us in the words *town* and *heath*. The modern German *Zaun*, which still signifies a “hedge,” is radically identical with our *town*, indicating that the latter meant primitively a “fence, or hedge,” then *enclosure*, *homestead*, *hamlet*, *village*, *town*. All outside this *fence* or *hedge* were *heathen*, *heath-men*, just as we even now speak of certain communities as being beyond the *pale* of civilization. Another example we have in the history of Ireland, where the city-districts under the rule of the English since the time of King Henry II, were called the “English *pale*,” and marked off from the less civilized and ruder portions of the Island to the south and west, where the peasant-Irish still maintained their independence.

When Christianity was preached to the Goths, and other rude Teutonic tribes, it was the dwellers within the *pale*, the *hedgers*, or townsmen, who received it first; the last and slowest to absorb the new ideas were the heath-dwellers, the *pagani* of our ancestors. The new-made converts in the villages, despising their brethren of the plains, gave the old term *heathen* a new meaning. Henceforth *heathen* were such as refused to receive or had not yet received the Gospel. From the plains of North Germany the cognate word passed into England with the Anglo-Saxon conquerors and, with the enormous extension of the English language, has circled the globe. In the Middle Ages the Saracens, in whose possession had been the Holy Land, it afterwards included the majority of the earth’s inhabitants, not the simple dwellers on the plains as in the days of old, but those whose home was in the mighty cities of the Orient, whose myriad temples and magnificent palaces betokened a civilization older than that of Europe, whence came the term by which they were now to be known.

Heathen originally expressed the contempt and hatred of the town for the country; its last lingering use is to express the

ideas which orthodox Christians of the straitest sect entertain with regard to the millions who are without the *pale* of salvation.

How the *heathen* were treated before and after the appearance of Christianity upon the stage of the world's history needs not to be told at length. German children, playing about on the shores of the Baltic Sea, call that sport which consists in making flat-stones skip over the surface of the water, when flung from the hand, "pelting the heathen." Here, as in many other instances, the sports of children represent the cruel earnest of their ancestors in the long ago, and it is easy to conjecture what was the "pelting of the heathen," in remoter centuries of human history. In the olden time it must have fared hard indeed with those who were without the *pale*, the *hedge*, and by inherited spirit of exclusiveness a great Church of to-day has been thought to teach that beyond its spiritual *pale*, there is no safety for the soul.

But there are other *heathen* than heretics. In Dutch *heiden* means besides *heathen*, "gipsy, vagabond, clown." From this language comes our word *hoyden*, formerly signifying "clown, rustic, lout," but latterly applied to a "romping girl, a tom-boy." In Welsh, strangely enough, the word (borrowed from English) *hoiden* means "a coquette."

We have glanced at the history of *pagan*, *gentile*, *heathen*, and learned what they have to tell us of primitive sociology; let us consider another group of terms, *foreigner*, *stranger*, *alien*. The words *foreigner* and *stranger* are both radically the same in meaning. Tracing *stranger* through the O. Fr. *estrangier*, we reach its original in the Latin *extraneus*, "he who is without outside (*extra*)," while *foreigner*, in like fashion, we owe to a Low Latin *foraneus*, the root of which is *foras*, "out of doors." Not speech, village, or hedge, was the test here, but the very house itself,—“the stranger,” “the foreigner,” was “he who was out of doors.” If, after centuries of progress and development, it fares so ill now-a-days with “the stranger who is within our gates,” how was it with him in days of yore, who failed to or was unable to claim the sanctuary of the threshold, and for whom no city of refuge opened wide its welcome doors! In those early times, as is shown by our word *guest*, which is radically the same as the Latin word *hostis*, “an enemy,” the *guest* was looked upon in the light of an “enemy”

("a stranger"). How hard must have been the lot of him who was "a stranger in a strange land," and how much need there was for the divine injunction: "Be not forgetful to entertain strangers, for thereby some have entertained angels unawares." How long it was ere the kindly thought enshrined in *neighbor*, "the near dweller," developed itself, we know not.

The word *alien* narrows still more the circle of vision. The root of the Latin *alienus*, whence, through Old French, our term has come, is *alius*, "other." So primitively the *alien* was "the other,"—all else than himself the first patriot called "alien."

Yet another series of words may justly claim our attention here, while we are considering the relations of country and city,—*house, home, family*. A *house* was, in the beginning neither more nor less than "a hiding-place," for such is the ultimate signification of the term. The first rude shelter, cave, or leafy bower, in which our Teutonic ancestors took refuge from the inclemencies of the weather or the ravages of wild beasts, they called by a name which survives with us still, altered somewhat in form but how ennobled in meaning! *Home* signified originally "a stopping-place"; the earliest "home" was where the rude forefathers of our race first *staid* or *rested*. What nobility of thought has not each successive generation since read into the word! The regret we feel, in these days of culture and civilization, at leaving home is comparable only to the joy of prehistoric man in finding it. The feeling of *home* is justly styled one of the greatest achievements of the Teutonic stock from whom we have inherited our language. In Gothic, *haims*,—the equivalent of our *home*,—meant also "village," while the Icelandic *heimr* included the whole "world," the *home* or the *homestead* of man.

A *family*, if we trust the Latin original of the word, was first the group of workers or slaves within the house or belonging to it, the "household (those the house held)," as our better Saxon speech has it; it was later that it acquired the meaning we now attach to it. The primitive Latin city then was the first family in the sense just noted, and there we can mark the germs of many of the phenomena now known to characterize urban life. From the words *hamlet, village, town, city, country, state*, we can learn much of value in our study of human relationships. A *hamlet* was once nothing more than "a little

ham, or *home*." The word *village* comes into English from Latin through French. In Latin *villa* (the older form is *vicula*) meant "a little village." A "village" was *vicus*, a word identical with the *wick* of many English town-names, found in Gothic as *weihs*. The radical signification of the word is said to be "a dwelling-place," "a place where one settles,"—a "home" in fact. The corresponding word in Greek is *οἶκος* which, however, signifies "house," just as we found the Gothic *haims* to mean "village," and as *villa* even now with us means "a country-house." The rich man's *villa*, in the country, or by the sea-side, often repeats, curiously enough, the facts of ages ago when the first *villas* or villages arose in the land. Many a so-called "country-seat" is really a "village" of a more or less primitive type, though furnished with so many of the trappings of modern civilization.

Another common word in Latin for "village" was *pagus* (cf. *pango* "I fix"), which signified originally "a place with fixed boundaries," recalling the meaning of *town*, already discussed. The English *thorp*, "a village," a loan-word from the Scandinavian languages, calls up the ordinary (and cognate) German word *Dorf*. In Swedish *torp* signifies "a small farm," also a "cottage," which former meaning it has as well in Icelandic. Related words are: Gothic *thaurp*, "a field"; Lithuanian *troba*, "building, house"; Irish *treabh*, "a farmed village, a village around a farm, a tribe, family, clan"; Welsh *tref*, "a home-stead, hamlet, town." One can see the interplay of country and town well-exemplified here. The *thorp* was perhaps the cluster of houses,—at first a single house, doubtless,—around a piece of tilled land, an idea not far removed from *pagus* and *town*, although it has been held that the notion of "crowding, clustering" underlies the term. In the newly-settled districts of the West, we can discover not a few analogues of the primitive *thorp*, which also invites comparison with the New England villages with their "town-meetings."

The idea of "crowding, clustering" comes out strongly in the Greek word for city, *πόλις*, the original sense of which seems to have been "a crowd" or "a throng." It is to this Greek word that we trace back our word *politics* and its derivatives in English. The original city was merely a crowd, and, as Gustave Le Bon⁶ points out in his recent interesting and ingenious volume on the *Psychology of Crowds*, the foundation of sociology is the

psychology of the crowd. "In this era of decadence, crowds are the characteristic of the age," says the author—"in the general leveling that is going on, facilitated by ease and frequency of relations, races are tending to lose their characters,—their *souls*, as it were,—and to return to their originals, crowds, nothing but crowds." M. Le Bon, who seems just touched with pessimism, considers that these phenomena of our cities "street-crowds, election-crowds, parliamentary mobs, etc., are inferior beings, who will ultimately reduce society to barbarism," and we shall have nothing but the pristine crowds, impressionable, violent, mobile.

Then, indeed, will the undegenerate, if there be yet any such in existence, be forced:

"[But] 'midst the crowd, the hum, the shock of men,
To hear, to see, to feel, and to possess,
And roam along, the world's tired denizen,
With none who bless us, none whom we can bless."

Our word *city* we get, through French from the Latin *civitas*. The older meaning of the Latin term seems to have been "community,"—later came the significations, "town, state," groups of *cives*, or citizens. Now the *civis*, or "citizen," was originally the inhabitant of a "hive," or "resting-place" (cf. *L. quies*), and our English words *home* and *hive* are probably cognate. It is, therefore, quite early in the history of the human race that the question of Du Bartas³ might have been put:

"For where's the state beneath the firmament
That doth excel the bees in government?"

Again the primitive "*city*" and the "*home*" are practically one and the same thing. From the Latin *civis* and the idea embodied in it and its cognates, we have borrowed our words *civil* and *civilization*, and philology, in the history of the term, tells the same tale that the poet Lowell has so neatly condensed in his epigrammatic line:

"Before man made us citizens, great Nature made us men."

And once more are re-enacted on a far grander scale the scenes of prehistoric times, for the "hives or industry" recall, in name even, their prototypes of old.

The word *state*,—Latin *status*,—first signified "something standing," then "the standing institutions, or authorities,"—

we still hear of "the states of Holland,"—then, after long centuries, that abstraction, which so worries the political philosopher.

A *country* was simply the region or district "over against" or "opposite" the people, the primitive city, who applied the term. This its etymology from the Latin *contra*, "against" clearly shows, as does also its shadow, the German *Gegend*. Here we have the antagonism of *city* and *country* reduced to its simplest terms, a topographic or spatial fact. In many languages the words for *country* have the same meaning as the Latin *terra* and the German *Land*, which refer simply to the "ground" or "earth," the inhabitants of which are termed *terræ filii*, *Landesleute*, "sons of the soil." It is in later ages only that we find such terms as the Latin *patria* and the German *Vaterland*, telling of the power and influence of the male parent, just as the Greek *Μητροπολις* (mother-city) and our own *mother-land* tell of the esteem in which the mothers of the race have been, and are still, held.

The Latin *regio*, whence our *region*, meant "something ruled over" (cf. *rex*, "a king"), while a *district* was "where one had the power to *distrain*." It must have been a long time before the Romans attached its best meaning to *respublica*, "the republic," "the common thing;" or as the Puritans of Old England and their descendants in Massachusetts to-day phrased and still phrase it, "*the common weal*," "*the common wealth*." Little communities like Andorra and San Marino, survive to-day, amid the mighty centralizing forces of European empires and kingdoms, to remind us of the small beginnings of the primitive *respublica*, a fact illustrated a hundred times over by the little towns of New England with their archaic forms of government, republics within a republic.

This brings us to the consideration of our last group of words: *clan*, *tribe*, *folk*, *people*, *nation*, *races*. The Latin word *tribus* is traditionally interpreted as coming from *tres*, "three," the original *tribe* having been "a third part" of the Roman people, one of the three families,—Ramnes, Tities, Luceres,—of which they primitively consisted. The Celtic word *clan* signified "a tribe of families;" the meaning of the Latin *gens* we have already seen.

Our good old English term *folk* originally meant a "heap" or a "crowd" of men, a "flock of people," then "a division

of an army," still later "people, nation." When we speak, therefore, of "people flocking together" we are employing a very ancient figure of speech, for in prehistoric times there were *flocks* of birds, of beasts and of men.

The Latin *vulgus* signified also, in primitive times, "a throng, a crowd, a troop, a flock, a herd." It was not until comparatively late that *vulgus* came to be applied to the common people, "the vulgar herd," as the patrician then and now was fain to term them.

The Latin *populus*, the original of our *people*, meant once "a fullness of men," the many, the crowd. A derivative, the German *Pöbel*, by an atavism of ideas, still signifies "a mob." In Spanish *pueblo*, the representative of the Latin *populus*, means "town, village," as well as *people*, and is applied alike to the oldest urban settlements of both hemispheres, the villages of the secluded Basques in Spain and of the Indian tribes of Peru, Mexico and Arizona.

A *nation*,—Latin *natio* (cf. *nascor*, "I am born") was but a "birth," or "those born together of one stock," a part of the great "birth," or *natura*, *Nature*. Similar is the primitive signification of *race*, which, through French we derive from Teutonic sources, "a direct line," or "those who are descended in a direct line." Even our word *world*, when we trace it back to its primitive signification, is really *wer-eld*, "the age of men," and our kinsmen of old, the Goths, called it *mana-seths*, "the seed of men."

The Greek *δήμος* meant originally "a country-district," and afterward "the people" inhabiting it. What a vast advance it is, in some respects at least, through centuries of evolution, from this primitive concept to our modern *democracy*. And, as of old, the strength of *democracies* lies in the country-folk, and the floating population of great industrial centers.

Another Greek word *λαός* was applied to "the mass of the people," and in our words *lay* and *laity*, its derivatives, lies an interesting bit of history. Now-a-days, when so many of the *laity* exceed the clergy in wisdom, character, and often in religion, the sting that formerly dwelt in the term is pointless. The *lay* were once the ignorant populace, the secular classes, as opposed, to the learned or *clergy*, the *clerks*, as they used to be called.

All over the world we might wander and find analogues and parallels for all we have just said, but enough has been given to illustrate, by means of philology, the development of human thought along the lines of *city* and *country*. Let us now turn to other sources of information at our disposal.

Cowper sums up a common view of country and city in these lines:

“God made the country, and man made the town;
What wonder then that health and virtue, gifts,
That can alone make sweet the bitter draught
That life holds out to all, should most abound,
And least be threatened in the fields and groves?”

It is fitting to inquire what truth lies in these words. More than 60 years ago Dr. Price,⁴ from an examination of the mortuary statistics of certain English and Continental cities, found that “human life is shorter by almost one-half in cities than in the country,” and declared that there was much truth in the saying “great cities are the graves of mankind.” This unfortunate condition of affairs he refused to credit to Nature: “The reasons of the baneful influence of great towns, as it has been now exhibited, are plainly—*First*, the irregular modes of life, the luxuries, debaucheries, and pernicious customs, which prevail more in towns than in the country. *Secondly*, the foulness of the air in towns, occasioned by uncleanness, smoke, the perspiration and breath of the inhabitants, and putrid streams from drains, churchyards, kennels, and common sewers” (p. 153). This sort of argument has continued down to the present day; and certain would-be sociologists denounce the city in terms quite as *outré* and as unjustifiable. From time to time, however, more or less interesting and satisfactory answers and part-answers have been made. Thus, in 1892, Dr. Leffingwell⁷ in his study of *Illegitimacy* remarks:

“The wickedness of cities, and the virtues of rural populations have been a theme for dramatists of every age. To some extent there is a justification for the common belief. Crime, as a trade, best flourishes in centres of population; the professional burglar or thief seeks companionship in guilt amid the slums of a great city; the country girl ‘in trouble’ would perhaps hide her shame in town. It may be doubted, however, whether, in proportion to total population, the percentage of the vicious is so much greater in cities than in rural communities” (p. 30).

Again:

“Is the virtue of chastity far more highly prized by the peasant? It is not made evident by statistics. The great cities of England nearly all show a proportion of illegitimate births below the rate prevalent in certain agricultural and rural districts, inhabited by an honest, sober, industrious and estimable population. Contrast, for instance, the number of illegitimate (births) in every thousand births as they occur in the three principal cities of England, with the rate which obtains in some of the most beautiful of rural resorts” (p. 31).

Dr. Leffingwell considers that the objection “in large cities many such births escape registration and are put down as legitimate,” will hardly account for these great differences between city and country, for “if the rate of bastardy in Shropshire or Cumberland was universal throughout England, it would mean an addition every year of thirty thousand illegitimate births to the total for England and Wales” (p. 32).

Moreover, “it is a singular fact that not only counties but far smaller subdivisions of counties sometimes exhibit a perverse and violent tendency toward illegitimacy. The worst districts show a rate nearly double that of England and Wales” (p. 32).

Dr. Leffingwell remarks:

“In every one of these [15] rural districts the proportion of bastardy is exceedingly high, in nearly all of them more than double the rate of England as a whole. Half a century ago the rate of illegitimacy *in every one of these districts was also higher*, and in most cases far higher, than the average of the country at large. There are therefore certain sections of England and Wales where every sixth or seventh or eighth child is a bastard! Yet every one of these districts is at some distance from any great city. It is a curious fact that in three English counties adjoining each other, the rate of illegitimacy seems to increase in proportion to their distance from London, and this peculiarity goes back many years” (pp. 33-34).

The general conclusion at which the author arrives is:

“Is rural life then more favorable to these illicit relationships? One can hardly affirm this at present. There may be a tendency to change of residence by young women in trouble from cities to their country homes, or from rural neighbourhoods to the city streets. How far these counterbalance each other one cannot say. Probably the equilibrium is not much disturbed either way, since changes of habitation are impossible to the great mass of the lower orders. In large towns there is possibly more of vice and dissipation than in the country; at all events it is there more con-

centrated and obvious. The statistics I have gathered certainly would indicate that a singularly lax theory of sexual morality obtains in some of the most secluded and remote districts of England and Wales" (p. 35).

Statistics of other items of crime or degeneracy than illegitimate births could also be cited to show that the "gulf" between the "bad" *city* and the "good" *country* exists sometimes only in the imagination of the prejudiced observer. One of the most familiar arguments against the city is its "unhealthiness." "greater mortality," etc. But, not alone the statistics of German cities (in a land where statistics are so obtained as to be really reliable), but those of some of our American cities also, show that the margin in favor of the country is gradually decreasing, and in a few cases has almost reached the vanishing point. Another matter of which very much has been made by the politophobiacs is the alleged failure of the city to produce its proper quota of men and women of genius,—the disproportionate number of "country-bred boys," who became great men, has been held up as proving inefficacy of the city as a nursery of genius. And the United States, in particular, has been pointed to as a marked example of the truth of this view. It should be remembered that the greatest men of the United States so far were all born soon after the beginning of the 19th century, with very few exceptions, and that in 1800 less than 4% of the population of the country was really urban. A fairer comparison could be made after a century or so of predominantly urban conditions. Even now the signs are not few that the city as the normal goal of civilization in America and elsewhere is already taking shape, and that the time for invidious comparison of the old sort between "city" and "country" will soon be past forever. The "shift" of population from country to city is coming to be recognized as normal and necessary and beneficial to both. The consciousness of this normality is beginning to be felt everywhere. As Professor S. A. Cudmore,² a very recent writer on this topic, says:

"The decline of rural population has been to the economic advantage of the people of the North American Continent as a whole."

And it has brought with it a great deal more than merely economic benefits.

In an interesting article in *Scientia* for 1911, Dr. H. Fehlinger⁵ sets forth the newer evolutionary view of "the biological influence of urban civilization," and criticizes certain *outré* arguments of the older school. The conclusion at which he arrives is this (p. 434):

"It would be a mistake to see in the city (the goal of modern migrations and the center of mingling of types of different races) a danger to the progress of human development and civilization."

The city is slowly coming into its evolutionary rights, and ere long the "mark of Cain" upon it will be completely obliterated. When man, like God, has come to see that it is "very good," the really important *rôle* of the city in religious evolution will be possible without let or hindrance. Then will the "Eternal City" and the "New Jerusalem" dreamt of by man so long, the metropolis of the votaries of "Peace upon earth among men of good-will," appear, to remain for ever.

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A CHRONOLOGICAL NOTE ON THE PHYSIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PROHIBITION OF INCEST

By H. F. MULLER,
Columbia University, New York

In Mr. Salomon Reinach's study on the prohibition of incest¹ we find the following passage:

"Morgan prétend que l'exogamie a pour cause les mauvais résultats souvent imputés aux mariages consanguins. A quoi M. Durkheim répond . . . que les législateurs avant le XIXe siècle, ne se sont pas préoccupés de considérations utilitaires et physiologiques. D'ailleurs, l'interdiction de l'endogamie est d'autant plus rigoureuse que l'état de civilisation des tribus est plus primitif; cela seul suffirait à prouver qu'il ne peut s'agir d'une loi d'hygiène. C'est seulement vers la fin du XVIIe siècle qu'apparaît, dans la littérature, l'idée que les unions consanguines affaiblissent la race. Les rédacteurs de notre code civil eux-mêmes ne s'y sont pas arrêtés."

This statement must be qualified. Without affecting the general conclusion that the causes of the prohibition of incest are not physiological but religious, and belong to the taboo class, nevertheless, the desire, on the part of the legislator, to justify this prohibition on the ground that incestuous intercourse is detrimental to the race, is much older than the XIXth and even the XVIIth century.

A law of Gratian (35, Q, 2, c. 20) in the latter part of the IVth century allowed marriages between first cousins. In the very last years of the VIth century, Pope Gregory the Great (595-604) answered as follows a query of St. Augustine, the apostle of England:

"Sexta interrogatio Augustini.²

"Usque ad quotam generationem fideles debeant cum propinquis sibi conjugio copulari et novercis et cognatis si liceat copulari.

"Responsio beati Gregorii papae.

"Quaedam terrena lex in Romana republica permittit ut sive fratris, sive sororis, seu duorum fratrum germanorum, vel duarum sororum filius et filia misceantur. Sed experimento didicimus ex tali conjugio sobolem non posse succrescere."

¹ P. 161 of *Cultes, Mythes et Religion*, t. I, Paris, 1905, in *La prohibition de l'inceste et le sentiment de la pudeur* (pp. 157-172).

² In Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, t. 77, *S. Gregorii Magni Epistolae*, XI, LXIV.

One must bear in mind the importance of canon law and jurisprudence during this period. The argument of Gregory that experience had shown such marriages to be barren, coming as it did from so important a pope, was not likely to be forgotten. A century later we see it reproduced in one of those collections of legal extracts for the use of the clergy, known as *Excerptiones*.³

“Item de consanguineis, Gregorius interrogationibus Augustini ita respondit. Quaedam terrena lex in Romana republica. . . . *Sed experimento didicimus ex tali conjugio sobolem non posse succrescere.*”

It can easily be seen that such a theory may have been spread among the people (with whom consanguineous marriages were quite common) by the teaching of the clergy, long before the rationalists of the XVIIIth century interested themselves in this problem.

It also seems that this reason was brought forth, not to justify the position taken by the church, but to strengthen it; the proof is that, at the same period, canon law began to consider spiritual parentage and relationship as producing the same interdictions in regard to marriage as ordinary consanguinity.

³ In Migne, t. 89, *S. Egberti Eboracensis Episcopi Excerptiones* CXXX.

LITERATURE: BOOKS, ETC.

A Book of Devotional Readings from the Literature of Christendom.
 Edited by REV. J. M. CONNELL. London and New York: Longmans,
 Green and Co., 1913. Pp. xix, 295.

"From the literature of Christendom,"—this attractive and rather catholic phrase is not belied by the contents of this interesting book, which, "has been prepared not only for private reading, but also for the use of those Churches which, while continuing to regard the Bible as their chief lesson-book, are desirous of a more extended lectionary." It is not intended as a substitute for the Bible but as a supplement to it. It contains writings that "have been canonized by the heart of Christendom," writings that are "next to the Bible, our most precious heritage." The author thinks his work "should be a new symbol of the Church Universal and of the Communion of Saints, and should help to bring us into more active possession of many rich tracts of our spiritual inheritance." Besides words of Jesus and extracts from the writings of the Church Fathers and the Catholic Saints, this work covers a very wide field,—from King Alfred to Walt Whitman; from John Scotus Erigena to John Woolman (whom ex-President Eliot revived); from Meister Eckhardt to Matthew Arnold; from Dante to Tennyson, Longfellow, Whittier and Browning; from John Wycliffe to James Martineau; from John Hus to Joseph Priestley; from Savonarola to Wordsworth; from Erasmus to George Eliot; from Martin Luther to Theodore Parker. Others that find places here are: More, Latimer, Tyndale, Calvin, Knox, Hooker, Fuller, Boehme, Taylor, Baxter, Pascal, Bunyan, Penn, Madam Guyon, Fénelon, Butler, Wesley, Paley, Channing, de Lamennais, the two Newmans, F. W. Robertson, Tolstoi; Milton, Goethe, Coleridge, Shelley, Bryant, Whittier, Clough; Kant, Carlyle, Emerson, Mazzini, Ruskin, Jowett, etc. The selections include Wordsworth's "The Character of the Happy Warrior," the favorite poem of two Presidents of the United States; Clough's "Not in Vain"; Browning's "The Ascent of Man," from *Paracelsus*; the anonymous tenth century (?) hymn, "Veni Creator Spiritus"; St. Francis of Assisi's "The Canticle of the Sun"; Jacobus Benedictus' (?) "Stabat Mater Dolorosa"; John Hus's "Letter to the Whole Bohemian Nation"; Sir Thomas More's "The Religion of the Utopians," from his *Utopia*; Martin Luther's "Plea for Christian Liberty," from his *The Babylonish Captivity of the Church*; an extract on "The growing revelation of Divine truth," from John Robinson's *Address to his Congregation on the Eve of its Departure from Holland to America*, 21 July, 1620; John Milton's "On Truth and Liberty," from the *Areopagitica*; Coleridge's "The Bible," from his *Confessions of An Enquiring Spirit*; Channing's "Christians and the Cause of Peace," from his *Discourse on War*; Bryant's "To a Water-fowl"; Emerson's "The Over-soul," from his *Essay on the Over-Soul*; Martineau's "Immortality," from his *Endeavours after the Christian Life*; Mazzini's "The Victory of Truth," from his essay, *Faith and the*

Future; Tennyson on "Knowledge, Reverence and Faith," from *In Memoriam*; Theodore Parker, on "The Simplicity of Christianity," from his *Discourse on the Transient and Permanent in Christianity*; Whitman's "Prayer of Columbus," and "Song to Death"; Matthew Arnold's "The Noble and Great," from *Rugby Chapel*; Tolstoi's "The Teaching of Jesus," from his *My Religion*.

The compiler has done his work well and this book should be welcomed by every religious mind. It is the best anthology of its nature we as yet possess.

A. F. C.

Die philosophischen Auffassungen des Mitleids. Eine historisch-kritische Studie. Von DR. K. VON ORELLI, Pfarrer in Sissach. Bonn: A. Marcus & E. Webers Verlag, 1912. Pp. iv, 219.

This monograph consists of two parts, the first of which (pp. 1-169) deals with the philosophic conceptions of pity from the ancient Greeks down to Paulsen, while the second (pp. 170-217) treats of the psychological explanation of pity, the ethical value of pity, the utilization of pity in esthetics, and the metaphysical interpretation of pity. The author-index (pp. 218-219) contains no names of Americans, though the philosophers of the New World have not altogether neglected the subject from the point of view studied by Dr. von Orelli. The names of many authors referred to in the footnotes are not cited in the index. The English philosophers discussed are Bacon, Bayle, Beattie, Bentham, Butler, Clarke, Cumberland, Ferguson, Hobbes, Home, Hume, Hutcheson, Locke, Mandeville, Mill (J. S.), Shaftsbury, Smith, Spencer. As the chief special treatises on pity, the author mentions the following:

1. BÜCK, W. *Das Mitleid bei Kindern. Ergebnisse einer Umfrage* (Dissertation). Giessen, 1909.
2. GIESSLER, W. *Das Mitleid in der neuesten Ethik.* (Dissertation.) Halle, 1903.
3. PICKEL, G. *Das Mitleid in der Ethik von Kant bis Schopenhauer.* (Dissertation.) Erlangen, 1908.
4. STEIN, W. *Das Wesen des Mitleids.* Berlin, 1903.

Some periodical literature is also cited.

A. F. C.

Racial Contrasts. Distinguishing Traits of the Graeco-Latins and Teutons. By ALBERT GEHRING. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1908. Pp. vi, 237.

This book, which treats of music, literature, painting, architecture, and sculpture, intellectual and emotional characteristics, customs, and institutions, the fluctuations of beauty and morality, homology of thought and action, temporal expansion and contraction, organic evolution in the light of comparative philology, etc., aims at tracing "fundamental distinctions between the arts of the races, distinctions which, in a general way, are valid for all times and nationalities," and "then, having deduced from these the statement of an essential difference in mental nature between the peoples in question, to endeavor to trace this again in their intellectual and emotional characteristics, their customs and institutions." A specimen of the author's argument is the following (p. 8):

"The Germanic mind, then, is characterized by a more prominent

'fringe' than the Graeco-Latin. It delights in the unresolved, mysterious residues of experience, in the buzzing back-grounds, the contrapuntal play of side-theme and pedal point. The Graeco-Latin mind, on the contrary, loves clearness and precision. The world which it reflects is plotted off in neat conceptual charts. It progresses along a straight line, in a single dimension; the Teuton's advance, on the other hand, is broad and bi-dimensional,—harmonic and contrapuntal rather than melodic. The Graeco-Latin attends to but a single object at a time, which he perceives clearly and distinctly; the Teuton perceives a multitude of surrounding objects and relations in addition, which tend to blur the main topic of thought; he trails along with him a shower of mind-dust, clinging to and surrounding the nucleus of attention."

It is easy to find superficial data that seem to justify some of the conclusions here reached, but the history of the culture-development of the Mediterranean area is such as to make most of them impossible, or at least, very improbable. "Race-contrast" is magnified beyond all reasonable significance. In reading this book one ought to have close at hand for reference Boas's *The Mind of Primitive Man* (1911) and Guiffrida-Ruggeri's *Homo Sapiens* (1913).

A. F. C.

Der deutsche Wortschatz. Auf Grund des Deutschen Wörterbuchs von Weigand dargestellt von PROFESSOR DR. KARL BERGMANN. Ein Hilfsbuch für den deutschen Sprachunterricht auf höheren Schulen wie zum Selbststudium. Giessen: Verlag von Alfred Töpelmann, 1912. Pp. xii, 156.

This book is heartily to be welcomed. It is a classified study of the vocabulary of the modern German language, based upon the latest edition of Fr. L. K. Weigand's *Deutsches Wörterbuch* (revised and edited, after the author's death, by Prof. Bahder of Leipzig, Prof. Hirt of Giessen, etc.; 2 Bde. Leipzig, 1909-1910). Of the Introduction pages 1-13 discuss briefly the laws of basal signification of German words, the chief ideas underlying our words, re-interpretations and folk-etymology, so-called ellipse or omission, parallel developments of meaning, changes in meaning, figurative language, words important for the history of civilization; pages 14-19 treat of the composition and enrichment of the German vocabulary,—from Greek and Latin; French, Italian, Spanish; English, Norwegian, Slavonic, Hebrew, etc.; imitations of Latin, French, Italian, English, and other foreign words and phrases, antiquated renderings into German; influences of the meanings of German words by Latin, French, and English; enrichment of the vocabulary from special languages; enrichment of the vocabulary from High German and low German dialects; words formed by particular individuals, introduced or recommended by them; the resurrection of obsolete words; the antiquity and age of words; age of meanings; relationship of German to other kindred tongues (chiefly Greek and Latin). Pages 20-150 list the principal words of the German vocabulary, distributed in classes according to the rubrics discussed in the Introduction. There is also a subject-index (pp. 150-156). Interesting from the point of view of religion, morals and ethics is the list (p. 21) of terms relating to mental and moral activities and qualities from *Abicht* to *Zwist*. Also this list of ecclesiastical terms

(p. 25): *beten, Ehe, Friedhof, Gebet, Götze, Heide, Hölle, Karfreitag, Kirchspiel, segnen, taufen*,—there are others cited elsewhere, such as *Sündflut, Ostern, Messe, Fastnacht, Weihnachten, Kirmes*,—on pages 115-116 is given a list of ecclesiastical terms derived from Greek and Latin (classical and medieval). Of figurative expressions the following are of ecclesiastic origin more or less (p. 95): *Ausposaunen, nachbeten, abkanzeln, der blaue Montag, am Hungertuche nagen, mit seinem Pfunde wuchern, das A und das O, es ist Matthäi am letzten, Siebenschläfer, Uriasbrief, Urquell*. From cloister-life come *nüchtern, Speise, Kofent, Katzentisch, Nonne*, and perhaps *bunt* (p. 104). Many important words and reframing of words came with Luther's translation out of the Bible. Reminiscent of the story of the Fall is *Adamsapfel*, for which an earlier term was *Adamsbiss*, due to the same folk-idea as English "Adam's apple." Harking back to old Teutonic heathenism are these in one way or another (p. 105): *Harlekin, Walhalla, Buchstabe, lesen, Ungeziefer, gelten*, and several names of the days of the week, etc. The student of the psychology of language will find much of value in this book; likewise the sociologist and the historian of human civilization generic and racial.

A. F. C.

Japan and Japanese-American Relations. Clark University Addresses. Edited by GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE, Professor of History, Clark University. New York: G. E. Stechert and Co., 1912. Pp. xi, 348.

In this volume are reprinted twenty-two papers which have appeared or are soon to appear in the *Journal of Race Development*, having been presented at the Conference on Japan, etc., held at Clark University a year or so ago. The following are of special interest here:

1. Dr. J. C. BERRY. "Medicine in Japan: Its development and Present Status" (pp. 136-160).
2. Rev. A. J. BROWN. "The New Japan" (pp. 161-173).
3. Rev. G. M. ROWLAND. "The Modern Japanese Christian Church" (pp. 174-189).
4. Rev. C. M. WARREN. "Some Results of Christian Work in Japan" (pp. 190-203).

It is to be regretted that Prof. G. A. Dorsey's thoroughgoing demolition (presented at the conference of 1912), of Prof. Huntington's *outré* paper on "Geographical Environment and Japanese Character" (pp. 42-67) does not find place in this book. The medicine ought to have been given with the disease.

A. F. C.

Populära Etnologiska Skrifter utgifna under Redaktion af Professor C. V. HARTMAN, Intendent vid Riksmuseets Etnografiska Afdelning. 7. *Shamanismen i Norra Asien. Några Drag ur Shamanväsendets Utveckling bland Naturfolken i Siberien* af J. STADLING. Med inledande Förord af Professor NATHAN SÖDERBLOM *Om Makten och Själen*. Stockholm: Cederquists Grafiska Aktiebolag, 1912. Pp. xvi, 135. Illd. (20 figs.).

This monograph, forming No. 7 of the "Popular Ethnological Writings," published under the editorship of Professor C. V. Hartman, late of the Carnegie Museum in Pittsburgh, and now head of the Ethnographic

Section of the Swedish National Museum, is a valuable study of *Shamanism in Northern Asia*, by J. Stadling, to which Professor Nathan Söderblom contributes (pp. vii-xvi) a brief introduction on "Powers and Spirits." The eleven sections treat of the following topics: General survey, Primitive religious thought (animism and pro-animism), Dual division of spirits (origin of the human soul and existence after death; different fashions of burying), Sacrifice, Ancestor-cult, Professional development of Shamanism (primitive stages among the Paleo-Asiatics; higher stages among the Ural-Altaic peoples), Shaman drums and the ceremonial dress of the shaman, Professional female shamans, Shaman activity, "Little shamanism," Shamanistic poetry. In his introductory remarks Professor Söderblom discusses briefly the views and theories of Tylor, Frazer, Codrington, Marett, etc.

The word *shaman*, it seems (p. 1), is derived from the Manchu-Tungus language. This etymology is approved by the Buryat scholar, D. Bantzaroff, who rejects the derivation, suggested in certain quarters, from the Sanskrit *śramanas*, "ascetics." With the Manchu-Tunguses and closely related tribes *saman* (or *chamman*) is a term applied to persons who are supposed, when in an exalted condition of mind, to have direct relations with spirits, etc. From the Siberian Tunguses the word passed to the Russians and from them to the other civilized peoples of the West. The etymology given by the *Concise Oxford Dictionary*, viz., from Persian *shaman*, "idolater," is incorrect.

Among the peoples counted as more or less purely "shamanistic" today are the paleo-Asiatics (Chukchee, Koryak, Kamchadales, Yukaghir, Giliak, etc.); the Mongolian Tungus tribes (western Buryats around L. Baikal); the Turko-Tataric Yakuts; the Finno-Ugrian Ostiaks, Samoyeds, etc. The shamanisms of Siberia have come in contact on the south-east and south with Buddhism and Lamaism, on the southwest with Mohammedanism, and on the west with Russian Orthodox Christianity. The Mohammedanism of the Siberian Tatars and the Lamaism of the Transbaikalian Buryats are strongly mixed with shamanism. The influence of Russian Orthodoxy upon the religion of the heathen peoples of Siberia has been less. The Buryats of the south and east are Lamaists, but those of the west have preserved their old shamanism, but have assimilated or appropriated the higher culture of the Lamaistic Buryats. During the revolutionary troubles in Russia after the Japanese war, a large part of the "Christian" Buryats, Yakuts, and other natives, fell away from Russian Orthodoxy and went back to their old religion. Students of the religion of primitive peoples will find here an excellent summary of the chief facts concerning the shamanistic practices of the peoples of northern and northeastern Asia,—comparison with similar phenomena among the Indians of Northwestern North America suggests itself again and again.

A. F. C.

Die sprachliche Urverwandschaft der Indogermanen, Semiten und Indianer
von JOHANN TOPOLOVSEK. Wien: Heinrich Kirsch, 1912. Pp. xiii,
132.

The author of this book, who has spent more than twenty-five years in linguistic research, is Biblically monogenistic, and traces not only all

peoples of the globe, but all their languages as well to one original source, taking as his text the words in *Genesis* (11:1), "Erat autem terra labii unius et sermonum eorundem." He seeks to set forth the relationship of the Basque language with certain Aryan and Semitic tongues, the connection of Semitic and Slavonic speech and the general linguistic relationship of the Aryan and the Semitic stocks. The main part of the volume, however (pp. 70-123), is devoted to an attempt by comparison of a large number of words (terms of relationship; names of parts of the body; names of articles of dress; foods and drinks; diseases; implements and instruments; utensils; weapons, musical instruments; mammals, birds, amphibia, reptiles, fishes, insects, plants, metals and minerals, natural phenomena, festivals, deities, etc., etc.), to prove that the Quechua language of Peru is closely related to the speech of Aryans and Semites, and particularly that the connections are most notable and significant between that American Indian tongue and the Slavonic languages. Besides Quechua (and its relative Aymara) the author finds evidences of Semitic and Aryan relationship in Guarani, and the more primitive Botoeudo, and in Nahuatl, which he regards as "the link between the Indian language of South and of North America. The Algonkian tongues, too, show especially Semitic relations. All American Indian languages" go back to Semitic and Aryan origins. In the so-called Mediterranean race is seen "the linguistic primitive center of all races and peoples." The so-called Turanian and the Negro languages have a like ultimate origin. Europe was the scene of the dispersion of races, after the stage of "monosyllabism" in language was passed,—the development up to "monosyllabism" took place in some other part of the globe. The languages of the southern group (ancestors of the modern Slavs and Basques, etc.), are closely related to the Semitic tongues, and related also to the languages of the American Indians,—"the ancestors of the modern Slavs, Semites, and Indians of America, must have dwelt together a long time, judging from the evidence of language." It is the Indogermamic peoples of the north (Teutons, Celts) who have best preserved the original language of the Mediterranean or Caucasian race. That the author can praise, as he does (pp. 76-77), Rudolf Falb's book, *Urgeschichte der Sprache und Schrift*, does not dispose one favorably towards his arguments, and although this is a more scholarly and serious attempt at proving the relationships suggested, it is, none the less, an unsuccessful one. The comparisons made run all the way from Quechua *huasi* ("house")=German *Haus*, to Quechua *soco* ("grey hair")=Hebrew *zàgên* ("to be old"), and Quechua *t'anta* ("bread")=Irish *tuirend* ("wheat"). The comparison of a very ancient Quechua word with an old-world word of quite recent origin, and *vice versa* must occur again and again where the exact histories of the terms are unknown; a word that is simple in one language is made the equivalent of one that is compound and composite in another. On pages 106-107 the author lists words for deity, idol, devil, etc., and concludes that in the primitive unitary period words for "higher beings," and for the good and the bad principles already existed. The Quechua *conopa* ("image") is linked up with the Egyptian *kanôpus*, etc.; Quechua *huateka* ("deceiver,

devil") is made identical with Slovenian *hudik* ("devil"), and Quechua *villca* ("idol") with Slavonic *vila* ("nymph"). But the best of men cannot reach the goal in this way.

A. F. C.

Mind and Health, with an Examination of some Systems of Divine Healing. By EDWARD E. WEAVER, PH.D., Sometime Fellow in Clark University. With an Introduction by G. Stanley Hall, PH.D., LL.D., President of Clark University. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1913. Pp. xv, 500. Price \$2, net.

This book is the elaboration of a thesis for the Doctorate in Philosophy at Clark University. Outside of an introductory chapter (pp. 1-64) and three closing chapters (pp. 365-468) on "the demands of a valid religious system of healing," "what constitutes a valid religious system of healing," and "how the church may heal," the following topics are considered: The mind, consciousness and subconsciousness, theories of mind; the psychological principles of psychotherapy (the psychotherapeutic armamentarium, the psychotherapeutic technique); value, reality; religious reality; religious reality in some types of healing; religious systems of mental healing: Christian science, the Emmanuel movement, Divine healing (Dowieism, the Christian Alliance), metaphysical healing. There is appended (pp. 469-483) an extensive Bibliography of 372 titles, distributed over the fields of neurology, physiology, psychology, psychotherapy (general, special aspects, suggestion, hypnotism, pathological, psycho-analysis, religious psychotherapy) value and reality, etc. The book closes with an index of authors (pp. 485-488) and one of subjects (pp. 489-500), both two columns to the page. The equipments of bibliography and index are something for which the reader will be grateful, so seldom are books in English on the topics here discussed so well documented and indexed. Dr. Weaver gives a good *résumé* of the chief facts of mental healing and related systems of mind therapy. The author, while none too tender in his attitude toward Christian Science, is much less harsh than he might be with certain other "systems." It would seem, too, as if Freud and his school bulked a little too largely here.

A. F. C.

Etudes Bakango (Notes de Sociologie Coloniale). Par A. DE CALONNE BEAUFACIT. Postface de E. Waxweiler, Professeur a l'Université de Bruxelles, Directeur de l'Institut de Sociologie Solway. Liège: Mathieu Thone, 1912. pp. 152. Avec Illustrations.

This pleasantly written volume records the author's impressions of the Bakango, a Negro people inhabiting the islands and sometimes the banks of the River Uelé, above the Mokwangu Rapids, as far as the Penga Rapids,—they have ascended the Bomokandi (called by them Likandi) as far as Poko. Groups of them are to be found on the Bima, below Zobia, and they have also a village on the Uéré. The language of the Bakango, called *Likango*, is an Ababua dialect, more closely related to the speech of the western than to that of the eastern Ababua.

The author treats of language, architecture and ornamental art, fishing and fishing-implements, agriculture, markets, social institutions, economic productivity, etc.

On page 44 the author notes with surprise that the Bakango entered the new-made house, as soon as the door was cut through without any *rites de passage* whatsoever. A little further on (p. 55) he protests against the attribution to the African Negro of "stagnant, passive mentality," expressing itself particularly in "an inability to acquire permanently the thousand and one little accidental inventions that pass unnoticed in normal times, but to which every crisis gives some special value," and cites an interesting example of this very sort of acquisition, which occurred under his own eyes. The activity of the Bakango is permeated with gaiety, vigor and *bonhomie*, and one is almost persuaded to credit them with what is generally denied to the Negro mind, viz., a sense of "sport." The Bakango seem to be acquainted with a large number of the fishes of their environment,—a list of over forty names is given on pages 70-71. The remark of a Bakango to the author (p. 95) is big with comment upon the results of white civilization,—"Since you whites have come here with your judges, is there any young man who listens to the elders, or any woman who remains virtuous?" The reaction of the Negro boatmen to the diving kingfisher (p. 104) is generically human and the plunging into the river by one of the boatmen of the little boy, who has managed to accompany the party is another very human scene that might have happened in many other parts of the globe. So, too, the answer of the old woman pottery-maker of Véréguangé, when asked why she ornamented the vessels she made in a certain fashion (p. 106): "My mother did so. I have made so many of them. Don't you think it beautiful?"

One of the mistakes so often made by the so-called "higher races" in dealing with the native tribes of their colonies and subject lands, is described on page 120. A change in policy placed the Bakango under the authority of the Ababua and the Asande. Against this one of the Bakango chiefs protested to the author as follows: "See how the European rewards us! Since the day you came, we have ceased to struggle against you. It is we, with the help of our canoes, with the strength of our arms, who led you to the conquest of the Upper Uélé. It is we, who, for 20 years, have carried your burdens and furnished you our sons as boatmen. It is we who have remained faithful at a time when all Ababua country was in revolt against you. And now you give us as slaves to these same Ababua! We, sons of chiefs, must obey people whose father was not even a free man!"

A. F. C.

Aus dem Lande Fritz Reuters. Humor in Sprache und Volkstum Mecklenburgs. Mit einer Einleitung über das Sammeln volkstümlicher Überlieferungen von Professor Dr. R. WOSSIDLO. Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1910. Pp. iv, 211.

Besides the author's interesting account of his experiences as a collector of folk-lore, extending over some 25 years, this little book contains material of various sorts on the following topics: Dancing, young people; expressions used to children; jests and jocular tales (pp. 90-105, 191-210); the country-people at work (a harvest-day); nicknames, etc., of the *personnel*, employees, etc., of a great estate; jests and merry tales

about shepherds; jests and merry tales about professions, workmen, etc.; animal-tales; card-playing; jests and tales about Teterow,—a collection of such humorous things as are told about one village by others, etc. It would be of interest and value, some time, to compare the mass of folk-humor here presented, which comes from the original home of the Anglo-Saxon, with corresponding folk-lore from primitive peoples, e. g., the Eskimo. As Dr. Wossidlo notes, some of his material is pan-European; part of it may also be pan-racial. There is in this book much of the rich humor that characterizes the people who have not yet become so *blasé* as to lose the generically human. Worth citing are the following sayings:

1. "One never gets out of trouble;" said the boy. "In summer it thunders, and in winter one has to go to school" (p. 64).
2. Neighbor will you kindly let my daughter knead your dough so her hands may get clean? She's going to a party (p. 98).
3. Leaving off work was made by God; it was the devil invented night-labor (p. 117).

On pages 154-162 are given some animal-tales of a merry sort that are to be found neither in Bartsch's *Sagen und Gebräuche aus Mecklenburg* (Vienna, 1879-80), nor in the second volume of the author's own *Mecklenburgische Volksüberlieferung* (Wismar, 1898, 1899, 1906). Dr. Wossidlo's introduction tells of the difficulties of entrance into the intellectual life of a people and of the intense pleasure of association with them, when their confidence has been won, and when by the possession of their speech one is able to commune with them in spirit and in truth,—crudely and rudely sometimes, but with satisfying reality. To our saying "It's all Greek to me," corresponds the Plattdeutsch "Is wol mihr hoochdüütsch." How well Dr. Wossidlo succeeded in reaching the heart of the Mecklenburgers appears from the story told of the working-woman who said, in reply to the question, "Wisst du nich na'n Theater?" "Ne, ik gah na'n Sozialen Abend von Herrn Voaslow." Some of Dr. Wossidlo's experiences are quaint enough. One woman, to whom he mentioned the subject of love-charms, said quite naïvely: "Ne, sowat bruken wi nich; hier bi uns kamen de Mannslüd' von sulm,"—"No, we never used such things; here the men came of themselves." The author makes it clear that there is a *Sammlerfreude*,—and also a *Sammler Glück*.

A. F. C.

British School of Archaeology in Egypt Studies Series. Vol. III. *The Formation of the Alphabet* by W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE. London: Macmillan and Co., 1912. Pp. iv, 20. With 9 Plates and 4 Figures in the Text.

The eight brief chapters of this timely monograph treat briefly of the general position (old and new views), the growth of signs, the signary before the alphabet, notes on various signaries, the vowels and the labials, the gutturals and dentals, the liquids, sibilants and aphonics, the order of the alphabet. On page 20 there is appended a "Note on the Arabic Alphabet." We have here an authoritative statement of the

newer views which must now be accepted instead of "the old traditional view of the derivation of the western alphabets from the Phoenician," and of the theory which "derived the Phoenician from the Egyptian hieratic writing of the XIIth dynasty." The first real "breach in the Phoenician tradition" came when "foreign alphabetic signs" were discovered at Tell el Yehudjeh, in Egypt. After this (in 1889) Prof. Petrie "found a mass of signs in use at Gurob in Middle Egypt which were unquestionably fixed to the period of 1400-1200 B. C.; and these signs were more akin to the western than to the Phoenician forms." Later, "such signs found likewise on pottery of the XIIth dynasty, earlier still in the 1st dynasty, and most of them were carried back far earlier, even to the first prehistoric civilization." They were shown thus to have existed "long before the hieroglyphic system in Egypt," and this fact "removed the last refuge of those writers who would see in them only a fresh type of cursive hieroglyphs, and would deny any connection with the same signs used in other lands." Other facts came to light from Crete, from Caria, from Spain, and other parts of the Mediterranean region—"material far older and far more widespread than the Graeco-Phoenician world."

The net result is thus described by Prof. Petrie (p. 2):

"The point of view here presented is not that of a systematic alphabet, invented by some single tribe or individual in a developed civilization. On the contrary, it appears that a wide body of signs had been gradually brought into use in primitive times for various purposes. These were interchanged by trade, and spread from land to land, until the less known and less useful signs were ousted by those in more general acceptance. Lastly a couple of dozen signs triumphed; these became common property to a group of trading communities, while the local survivals of other forms were gradually extinguished in isolated seclusion."

This gives us a sane and reasonable theory of the origin of our alphabet. As Prof. Petrie well says, "signs, rather than pictures, are the primitive system." Both in early Egypt and in early Crete such signs preceded the pictographic system. These signs originated and were further developed in ways that receive their interpretation, as the author observes (p. 3) from the facts of the evolution of drawing among children. The evolution of demotic writing in Egypt from picture-writing is comparatively late,—“it is true that pictographs or hieroglyphs tend to wear down, owing to being used in haste, until they become arbitrary marks or letters; yet that is only a late degradation, and cannot be looked on as the primitive growth of lineal signs.” The first systematic arrangement or classification of the "alphabet" probably took place in Northern Syria, whence it passed to Greece, as is indicated by "the Aramaean names of the letters *alpha*, *beta*, etc., ending in vowels, unlike the Phoenician and Hebrew; and this agrees with the tradition that the Asiatic Greeks of Ionia had the alphabet from Lykian and Kilikian tribes" (p. 19). Much of this first arrangement "still remains embedded in our alphabet." The details of the argument are well given in Prof. Petrie's text and the accompanying plates.

A. F. C.

Indian Shipping. A history of the sea-borne trade and maritime activity of the Indians from the earliest times. By RADHAKUMUD MOOKERJI, M. A. With an Introductory Note by Brajendranath Seal, M.A., Ph.D. Bombay, London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912. Pp. xxvii, 283. Illd.

This monograph, provided with indexes of subjects and proper names, contains much interesting information concerning the history of Indian shipping. As the author remarks (p. 6):

"The Indian evidences are those derived from Indian literature and art, including sculpture and painting, besides the evidence of archaeology in its threefold branches, epigraphic, monumental, and numismatic.

"The evidences of Indian literature are based chiefly on Sanskrit, Pali, and Persian works, and, in some cases, on works in the Indian vernaculars, Tamil, Marathi, and Bengali.

"The foreign evidences consist of those writings of foreign travelers and historians which contain observations on Indian subjects, and also of archaeological remains, such as those in Java. The former are embedded mostly in classical literature, in Chinese, Arabic, and Persian, to which we have access only through translations."

The various epochs of Indian history are roughly indicated as follows:

1. *The Pre-Mauryan Epoch* (from the earliest times to about 321 B. C.).
2. *The Mauryan Epoch* (321-184 B. C.).
3. *The Kushan Period* (in the North) and *The Andhra Period* (in the South), extending, roughly, from the second century B. C. to the third century A. D.
4. *The Period of Hindu Imperialism in Northern India under the Guptas and Haeshavardhana*, extending from the fourth to the seventh century A. D.
5. *The Period of Hindu Imperialism in Southern India and the Rise of the Cholas*, extending from the middle of the seventh century up to the Mohammedan conquests in Northern India.
6. *The Musulman (pre-Mogul) Period*, extending from the eleventh to the fifteenth century.
7. *The Period of Mogul Monarchy*, extending from the reign of Akbar to that of Aurangzeb, *i. e.*, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century.

Chapter II (pp. 32-52) deals with direct evidences from Indian sculpture, painting and coins. The earliest representations of ships and boats in old Indian art go back to the Sanchi sculptures, dating from the second century B. C., after which come the sculptures in the caves of Kanheri on the small island of Salsette, near Bombay. Among these is perhaps the oldest representation of a sea-voyage in Indian sculpture,—“a representation of a scene of shipwreck on the sea, and two persons helplessly praying for rescue to the god Padmapani, who sends two messengers for the purpose.” The celebrated paintings of the Buddhist cave-temples at Ajanta contain “a few very fine representations of old Indian ships and boats,” chiefly in Cave No. 2,—these date from 525 to 650 A. D. The conquest of Ceylon and of Java naturally furnished interesting items. Ancient sea-trade between India and Babylon has been much exaggerated

by some authorities. The "voyages of Solomon" are discussed on pages 91-95, and the words for "peacock" and "aloes" recognized as Tamil-Malayalam terms which have crept into the Hebrew text of the Books of Kings and Chronicles of the Old Testament,—*tuki*, e. g., is Indian *tokei*, while *ahalim* is from Tamil *aghil*. Interesting is the prayer (*Rig-Veda*, I, 97, 7 and 8), which the author takes as his motto: "Do Thou, whose countenance is turned to all sides, send off our adversaries, as if in a ship to the opposite shore: do Thou convey us in a ship across the sea for our welfare."

In connection with Java, the author observes (p. 148): "The first impulse to this colonizing activity and expansion of India had its origin in the obscure kingdom of Kalinga, whose early history nobody knows or cares to know."

A. F. C.

Bryn Mawr College Monographs. Monograph Series, Vol. XI. *The Cults of Ostia*. By LILY ROSS TAYLOR. Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, December, 1912. Published by Bryn Mawr College. Pp. vii, 98.

This is a thesis for the Ph.D. The subjects treated are: Greek and Roman Gods (Vulcan, Capitoline Triad, Castor and Pollux, Liber Pater, Venus, Fortuna, Ceres, Spes, Pater Tiberinus, Hercules, Silvanus, Gods of *Collegia*, Minor Cults, pp. 14-45; The Cult of the Emperors, pp. 46-56; Oriental Gods (Magna Mater, Egyptian Gods, Syrian Gods, Mithras, Other Solar Divinities, Sabazis, Caelestis), pp. 57-93. Pagan cults of Ostia (the evidence is chiefly epigraphical of the second and third centuries A. D.) alone are considered. Says the author (p. 10):

"Most of our evidence for the religious history of Ostia falls within the two centuries following the establishment of the new port [Portus]. This was the period when Oriental religions were everywhere undermining the old Roman beliefs and religious forms. At Ostia, where there was more constant contact with the East than elsewhere, the old cults had a particularly difficult and often an unsuccessful struggle to hold their own. The most important Oriental worshipers were firmly established here in the second century. Christianity early gained a strong foothold, and the later history of Ostia and Portus is closely bound up with the history of the Church."

At Ostia and Portus "remains of no fewer than eleven temples and of several small shrines have been found," but "only the shrines of Mithras, the form of which is unmistakable, a shrine of the emperors, and the temples of Magna Mater at Ostia can be identified beyond a doubt." Moreover, "the evidence for the cults of Ostia is so late that it is useless to try to distinguish between Greek and Roman gods." The oldest Ostian cult was probably that of Vulcan. Like many other Roman colonies, "Ostia imitated the mother-city by building a temple to Jupiter Optimus Maximus, Juno and Minerva, the great Etruscan triad who were worshiped on the Capitoline Hill in Rome." The establishment of this cult seems due to the fact that Ostia was a "citizen colony." Ostia seems to have been the only place where Castor and Pollux were worshiped as gods of the sea,—"a reflection of one of the most important aspects of their worship among the Greeks." The most

important Oriental gods at Ostia were Magna Mater, Isis and Mithras, and "the monuments of the cult of Magna Mater there are second only to those of Rome in importance,"—the city at the mouth of Tiber "was then perhaps the world's greatest port." There Oriental cults were largely supported "by freedmen or descendants of freedmen of Eastern origin." But "these new religions did not entirely drive out the old; the chief priest of the colony still continued to be called pontifex of Vulcan, and he had jurisdiction even over the temples of the foreign gods." At last, however, the cults of the East became firmly established, and "during the later empire among the priests of Isis at Ostia was a man of senatorial rank." A. F. C.

The Putumayo, the Devil's Paradise. Travels in the Peruvian Amazon Region and an Account of the Atrocities committed upon the Indians therein. By W. E. HARDENBURG. Edited and with an Introduction by C. REGINALD ENOCK, F. R. G. S., Author of "The Andes and the Amazon," etc. With 16 Illustrations and a Map. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1912. Pp. 347.

This volume is devoted chiefly to the conditions in the rubber-country of the Putumayo and to descriptions of the inhuman treatment of the Uitotos and other Indian tribes,—atrocities which, if not exaggerated, rival, or even excel, those perpetrated in the Belgian Congo not many years ago,—by the Rubber Companies and their employees of the white race. To read what is written in this book about the whites in contact with the so-called "savages" of this region must almost justify Alfred Russell Wallace, who himself saw some of these Indians during the later years of first half of the nineteenth century, in his belief that no supreme advance in morals has taken place since the time of the early Egyptian dynasties. In this guilt Peru, Great Britain, and the United States all share.

The anthropologist will be especially interested in Chapter V (pp. 141-163) on "The Huitotos," one of the least-known stocks of South American Indians. It contains notes of a general character on the Indians themselves, marriage, child-birth, death and burial, the "tobacco drinking" festival, houses, weapons (including the *obidique* or blow-gun), the *manguaré* (a sort of primitive wireless telegraph), dress, drink, use of *coca*, dances, religion, etc. Included is also a vocabulary of 121 words (pp. 150-151) and 27 brief phrases (pp. 151-152). Some of the information about these Indians seems to have been obtained by the author from Sr. Serrano. The passing of the Uitotos in the not very distant future, before the onslaught of white "civilization," will be one of the sad tragedies of the twentieth century. A. F. C.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

By ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN

47. *Art of the cave man.* In *The American Museum Journal* (vol. 12, 1912, pp. 289-295), Dr. Clark Wissler has a brief, but interesting and suggestive article on "The Art of the Cave Man," illustrated by examples from Le Chaffaud, Les Combarelles, Altamira, Font-de-Gaume, Cogul, Kesslerloch, Lorthet. Dr. Wissler points out that in this great problem of human culture "we are dealing with a psychological phenomenon rather than with a biological one." It is now being recognized that "Aurignacian culture flourished throughout Spain, France, Belgium, parts of Germany, and perhaps England." Says the author (p. 292):

"The cultural view of modern man applies equally well to the man of antiquity, and we are quite right in interpreting Aurignacian culture by what we know of living races. We believe that no one can look at the illustrations in this article without recognizing that their artists must have accomplished their work just as we would and moved along in the construction of their culture by steps analogous to our own. In other words, the universal human was there in that dim remote past, as it is with us still."

Dr. Wissler observes further (p. 295):

"We should not, therefore, take too seriously the view that the natural evolution of art is from the representative to the conventional, since the facts of anthropology as a whole make Aurignacian art, for instance, appear only as a school of art or a form of culture that developed but to be displaced by another. In this case, so far as we know, realistic art did precede the geometric, but this is merely a historical fact and not a biological one. There seems to be no inherent reason why geometric art might not have developed first, had the attention of Aurignacian man been focused upon it."

Similar reasons demand that "we must not be too dogmatic in the application of the 'no-composition' interpretation of Aurignacian art." After Aurignacian came Solutrean and Magdalenian art.

48. *Bantu star-names.* In *Man* (vol. 13, 1912, pp. 193-196) Miss Alice Werner publishes a "Note on Bantu Star-Names," resuming data of her own and material from the investigations of others. The topics considered are the Pleiades, Orion's Belt, Venus, Jupiter. The Pleiades are commonly associated with *agriculture*, and a widely-known name "is always derived from the 'applied' form of the verb *lima*=cultivate." This name appears in Zulu, Swahili, Giryama, Yao, Pokomo, etc. A Swahili proverb runs, "When the Pleiades set in sun, they rise in rain." Great attention has been paid to the three stars of Orion's belt, and "they are often known

by some name connected with *hunting*." The planet Venus is "usually associated with the Moon as 'his wife.'" Jupiter "seems to have attracted attention everywhere, owing to its brilliancy and its variable position in relation to other stars." The Suto name seems to signify "peg (or pin) of the night." The Basuto seem to have more star-knowledge than many other Bantu. The Zulus, according to Miss Werner, have a good many star-names. She also observes (p. 193):

"My impression, so far, has been that nearly, if not quite, all, the people with whom I have been brought into contact have lost much of the star-knowledge which they once possessed. This is shown (1) by the small number of stars known by name; (2) by the same name being applied to different stars, or groups of stars."

49. *Confucius*. In view of the practical abandonment of the old state-religion, as one of the consequences of the establishment of the new Chinese Republic, the article by Otto Messing, on "K'ung (Konfuzius) und seine Lehre," in the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* (vol. 44, 1912, 887-903), is of no little interest. The author discusses the name of the great philosopher, the political and religious conditions of his age, the literature of his philosophy and that of his disciples, his own religious ideas, teachings, etc., his theory of human nature, etc. It is said that direct descendants of Confucius, of the 76th generation, still exist in China. An interesting comparison with Moses (see p. 893) is possible. Generically considered, the teachings of Confucius rest upon a psycho-anthropological basis, and his knowledge of humanity was extraordinarily keen. Like Christianity, the "religion of Confucius," which became the "religion of China," stood for "the moral righteousness of man," and "the maintenance of political order in the world." Thus a transition from pre-Republican China with Confucian state-religion to a late China with Christianity, in some form or other, as a quasi state-religion, is by no means impossible.

Some recent works on Confucius and Confucianism mentioned by Messing are:

1. CHÊN HUANG CHANG. *The Economic Principles of Confucius and his School*. 2 vols. (N. Y., 1911).
2. RUDOLF DVORAK. *China's Religionen. I. Teil, Konfuzius und seine Lehre*. (Münster v. W., 1895.)
3. WILHELM GRUBE. *Die Konfuzianische Moral nach Konfuzius und Mengtze in A. Bertholet. Religionsgeschichtliches Lesebuch*: (Tübingen, 1908.)
4. WILHELM GRUBE. "Der Konfuzianismus und das Christentum," in *Deutsche Rundschau*, Heft 7, 1900.
5. JAMES LEGGE. *The Chinese Classics*. 7 vols. (Oxford, 1893.)
6. RICHARD WILHELM. *Die Religion und Philosophie China's aus Originaldokumenten übersetzt. Bd. 2. Kungfutse Gespräche*. (Jena, 1910.)

50. *Evolution of metallurgy.* The article of Professor William Gowland on "The Metals in Antiquity," in the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* (vol. 42, 1912, pp. 235-289), contains many interesting facts concerning the history of the use and manufacture of copper, tin, gold, silver, lead, iron. The first metal with which neolithic man became acquainted was probably the "native" gold of riparian sands and gravels and superficial alluvial deposits,—"one of the most worthless of metals for the practical purposes of life and especially for the simple requirements of stone age man." Copper, found in the metallic state in but few localities, occurs, nevertheless, in great abundance, and, consequently, was the first metal to be used by man in such regions. Among the curious facts noted by the author are these:

1. The first metal known to the Eskimo was iron,—they fashioned knives from the masses found at Ovifak (p. 236).

2. The Indians of the Lake Superior region, e. g., though acquainted with copper, "never discovered the art of melting the metal and casting it in moulds, and so still remained in the stone age of culture" (p. 239).

4. In Japan, in 1872, "no appliance of the primitive metallurgy of the bronze age could have been either simpler in shape, or ruder in construction than the furnace then in use and even still employed at many small mines" (p. 237).

5. There hardly was a true copper age in Europe, though "in Ireland, from the abundance of copper implements, which have been found there, there was evidently a stage of transition between the age of stone and the age of bronze, during which copper was in use" (p. 240).

6. In Britain, "suitable ores for the production of bronze were at hand, hence bronze, and not copper, was the first metal to be employed" (p. 239).

7. In Africa (apart from Egypt), "there are so far, no evidences of an intermediate stage between the use of stone and that of iron, notwithstanding the abundant deposits of copper and tin ores" (p. 240).

8. The first mining map in the world, reproduced on page 255, occurs in an Egyptian papyrus (now in Turin), and represents "a mining district of the time of Seti I (about 1350 B. C.) or Rameses II (about 1330 B. C.).

9. "The first metallurgical furnace was the camp-fire, and, as time went on, it gradually developed into the simple 'hole-in-the-ground' furnace, which still survives in Japan" (p. 240).

10. The marked absence of silver objects in early times in Egypt is difficult to explain (p. 268).

11. Noteworthy is the use of lead for inscribing tablets, plaques, and figurines for votive offerings, in ancient Greece, Rome, etc. (p. 273). This for both religious and secular purposes.

12. "Native" iron, whether of meteoric or telluric origin "can have played no part in the rise and development of the iron age" (p. 277).

The discovery of the metal iron arose, "either from pieces of rich iron ore becoming accidentally embedded in the domestic fire, the burning embers of which would easily reduce them to the metallic state, or it may be from primitive man having already obtained the metal copper from certain stones, experimenting with others."

The oldest known piece of iron dates from the fourth Egyptian dynasty, 3733 B.C., although iron implements and weapons are rare in Egypt till about 1500 B.C. In Africa, outside of Egypt, iron-smelting was carried on at a very remote date. Two early centers for the beginning of the iron age meet us in Europe,—Eisenerz in the Austrial Tyrol, and the Elban (Etruria) region of Italy,—and it was in the first of these that iron was first produced in that continent. Professor Gowland thinks that iron, like copper, was in use earlier in Asia than in Europe. The Yeshil Irmak-Batum region and the region of the Taurus and Anti-Taurus in Asia Minor are probably the earliest localities for the production of iron in Western Asia,—of these the former may have been first (p. 281).

In reference to the first beginnings of the age of metal the author remarks (p. 235): "It is too often assumed that, before man became acquainted with metals, he was a mere savage, but little superior to the wild animals of his time, but that this view is entirely erroneous, certainly as regards late neolithic man, is incontestably proved by the evidence presented so clearly to us by the vestiges which have been laid bare of his culture and mode of life.

"He was a farmer, kept domestic animals, was acquainted with the arts of weaving, the manufacture of pottery, his dwellings were constructed with considerable skill, and, at his death, he was buried with ceremonial rites." He had, it is certain, the beginnings of religion, which, later on, made extensive use of the "precious metals."

51. *Faust and St. Sebastian*. In the *Mercure de Paris* (vol. 101, 1913, pp. 524-535), A. Rémond and C. Soula, under the title "Faust et Saint Sébastien," compare interestingly Gabriele d'Annunzio's *Martyrdom of St. Sebastian* with the second part of Goethe's *Faust*. Just as Goethe, after the "despair" of Werther and the phenomena of the decline of one century and the birth of another, in both of which he shared, "sought, in the second *Faust*, to criticize the inanity of the metaphysical efforts of his time, and to find a formula that would permit those involved in this goalless agitation to recover themselves," so can it be said of d'Annunzio that, "after having celebrated the Venice of the past, and, in his book of the *Virgins*, the sad breaking up of the old races, after having chanted the glory of the mechanism that lifts man materially and morally above his *misères*, he sought, in the glorification of a Christian hero, the counterpart of the painful Nietzscheanism that had ruled in his works." Both traversed the whole cycle of human love and their earlier works give the same impression of strained effort and the impossibility of achieving a definite formula for human love. Both, in a way,

escape to *God*, from their dilemma, but *God* heavily weighted by the personal coefficient of each. In other words (p. 525):

"The Satanic Odyssey of Dr. Faustus and the martyr's race of St. Sebastian are only the story of a man seeking to escape from the narrow framework of environmental limitations, and to perpetuate his life by joining it indissolubly with some eternal power." In both author's pride appears as "a condition necessary to the free manifestation of genius." For Goethe, the mental characteristic of his time is "the end of formalism and the triumph of the critical spirit"; for d'Annunzio, "the lassitude of the critical, and a neo-Catholic fetishism representing the average mentality of those set free by wealth." Goethe, so to speak, represents "profound Christian origins, on which have reacted the ancient philosophical ideas of Greece and Rome. D'Annunzio is pagan by nature, "for paganism has long impregnated the origins of his *milieu*, so that its genius is a function, not of the civilization, but of the Land of Italy itself." In a word, "Goethe is a pagan by education; d'Annunzio, a pagan by birth,—the latter tends to become the Christian the former has ceased to be." The Satanism of Faust, and the Christianity of Sebastian are both, after all, "the deformed confession of their primitive faith." And both authors employ "white magic" to give the public the sensation of the supernatural. St. Sebastian "rises as high as he can be carried by the double decadence of the two Romes, pagan and Christian; Faust, neither pagan, nor Christian, dominates all theocracies from the heights of criticism, which is the supreme manifestation of human freedom."

52. *Fijian religion*. In an article "On the meaning of *Kalou* and the origin of Fijian temples," in the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* (vol. 42, 1912, pp. 437-449), A. M. Hocart uses the term *Kalou* to assert that "most of the Europeans who lived in heathen Fiji quite misconceived its religious beliefs," and expresses the belief that "temple and grave are both derived from a common original, to wit, the dwelling-house, or more especially the 'hall' (*mbure*)," (p. 447). In eastern Fiji "graves are degenerate houses of common people, and temples the exalted halls of chiefs." Of the *Kalou* shrine (*mbure kalou*), the author says (p. 448): "Modern houses, in certain parts of the Highlands strongly suggest by their very high roofs the pictures of old Fijian Temples, and it is therefore possible that the *mbure kalon* has retained the original architecture of the ancient home of the people." According to Mr. Hocart, "*Kalou*, in short, means nothing more or less than 'the dead,'" and "stands for a concept which runs unchanged through the whole of Melanesia, though many and various are the verbal forms it assumes." The resemblance between a modern Fijian grave and the foundation of a house, "is hard to overlook." The application of *Kalou* to men and wonderful objects is simple enough. One needs, as Mr. Hocart notes (p. 437), to beware of the equation *tevoro*=*timoni*=*kalou*. The term *timoni*, in use chiefly in the Eastern

Is., is the English *demon*, while *tevoro* (possessing meanings never held by its English original), "has now become naturalized in the language all over the group, and is apt to pass itself off both on whites and natives as of Fijian origin." Really, it "is none other than our own word *devil*, as pronounced by the Tahitian teachers who first brought Christianity to Fiji." *Tevoro* usurped the function of the old native term *kalou*. In some parts of the country old men still use *kalou* for *tevoro*, which is recognized as a word that came in with Christianity. The history of the contact of heathenism and Christianity in Fiji would make an interesting psychological study. Mr. Hocart is right in calling attention to "the diversity which exists in Fiji, not merely in individual names, but even in the very type of religious beliefs prevailing in various regions."

53. *Homeric geography*. In an article, "Au pays de Circe," in *Mercure de France* (vol. 101, 1913, pp. 673-703) Philippe Champault discusses some questions of Homeric geography,—the coast of the Laistrygons, the land of Circe, the country of the dead, etc. The first region mentioned he identifies with Porto Pozzo and Pianosa. The Ocean river is the Bocche di Bonifacio, and the country of the dead the northwest coast of Sardinia around the mouth of the river Coghinas. Some of his arguments (certain etymologies, in particular) are of doubtful value. The author has previously sought to identify Homer's Scheria with the island of Ischia, at the entrance of the gulf of Naples. He has also published a volume on the *Phéniciens et Grecs en Italie d'après l'Odyssée* (Paris, 1911). In an islet close to Sardinia, called to-day *scoglio Colombo*, he sees the Latin *Columbarium promontorium* Homer's *lais-trygonie*, "rock of doves." The *tumbas de los gigantes*, the megalithic monuments of Sardinia, are also brought into the argument. The bay of *cala della Ruta*, in the Pianosa region, gets its name from *ruta*, the *peganum harmala* (Linn.), a species of rue famous as a remedy against the evil eye, etc. This the author thinks may well have been the *moly* that preserved Ulysses from the Circean sorcerers. The *nuraghi* of Sardinia, we are informed, are still termed by the natives "houses of Pluto or of the dead, *domos de Orcu*." Cape della Testa more anciently bore the name of *Erebanthion*, "cape of Erebus." The region west of the Coghinas was the country of the ancient *Sassari*, "who pronounce this name themselves as *Tátari*," perhaps "Tartari," i. e., "Infernales." M. Champault has a tendency to interpret classical names by Semitic etymologies, which is not at all to be commended. Nevertheless, his writings on Homeric geography form an interesting addition to the ever-increasing literature of the subject.

54. "*Homo faber*" and "*Homo religiosus*." In an article on "Le rythme du progrès et la loi des deux états," published in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* (vol. 21, 1913, pp. 16-60), Louis Weber

discusses human progress in relation to "the law of the two states," arguing that *Homo faber* (representing the technical and fabricative faculty) and *Homo religiosus* (social, collective life) are each, one no less than the other, and perhaps no more, specific names of man; and that there exists in progress "a rhythm corresponding to the duality of origin of human knowledge,—the material objects with which man is in physical contact, and the knowledge with which he enters into communication, or, in a word, matter and society" (p. 16). To make religion disappear, as to origins, entirely in the broader category of the social, as does the sociological school, e. g., is extending unjustifiably the educative power of society and failing to recognize the technical faculty in man, a marked anthropological character. Bergson, also, in his *Évolution créatrice*, paralleling and opposing intelligence to instinct, considers *Homo faber* too exclusively. Nothing authorizes the belief that, from its beginnings, the development of mechanical aptitude has been subordinated to the development of the social life (p. 17). Auguste Comte, at a time when prehistoric archeology was not yet born, set forth a theory of "three states" of intellectual progress, as revealed in human history. Facts at our disposal to-day rather favor the theory of "a sort of binary rhythm, consisting in the alternation of periods in the course of which technical activity and speculative activity preponderate in turn." Intellectual progress has a duality of origin, a duality of direction and a duality of manifestation. It is very probable that there is an alternation of phases, the technical and the reflectional: "Between these two sides of intelligence, between geometrico-mechanical comprehension of the external world and the speculative idea of this same universe, formed in us when we take knowledge of it through the social categories, there is neither harmony nor rational correspondence, but, visibly, discord." Indeed, it might be said that "man, when he reflects upon his nature and his condition, thinks with the brain of another age,—possessing the technical knowledge of an adult, he philosophizes, nevertheless, like a child." The Australian natives, "with their contrast of a mentality completely oriented towards things of religion and magic and a slackening of technical activity (if not a complete arrest of all inventions)," seem to furnish an argument in favor of the priority of technique. They give the impression of "a society which has not passed out of the first phase of reflection, following the first phase of technique." The marked orientation of Greek civilization toward "pure ideas" may be explained as "a derivation of the technical spirit," for which was responsible "Socrates, inventor at one and the same time of moral technique and idolatry." The infiltration of Judaism into the Graeco-Roman world "did not modify the theoretic and dialectic tendency of its thought, but it did gradually change the object of its speculations." To what extent a fusion of *Homo faber* and *Homo religiosus* is possible is rather a question of metaphysics.

55. "*Land of Lyonesse.*" In Arthurian legend figures the "land of Lyonesse," called by Tristram "our rough Lyonesse," the scene of the last great battle and the final conflict between Arthur and Sir Mordred:

"So all day long the noise of battle roll'd
Among the mountains by the winter sea;
Until King Arthur's table, man by man,
Had fallen in Lyonesse about their Lord."

The "land of Lyonesse" is fabled to have been buried forty fathoms deep. An old British tradition makes out that a large tract of land between Land's End and the Scilly Is. was once submerged by the sea,—this was, according to some "the fabled land of Lyonesse, the place of origin of the great King Arthur and the region also where he made his last stand. But Mr. S. H. Warren, in the course of an article on "The Classification of the Prehistoric Remains of Eastern Essex," in the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* (vol. 42, 1912, pp. 91-127), offers another theory. In connection with the submergence of certain regions of eastern and southern England indicated by the prehistoric remains found upon the submerged surface, he proposes to call it the "Lyonesse surface," being of opinion that "this submergence is the foundation of the legends of the Fabled Land of Lyonesse."

56. *Mesopotamian Christianity.* In the course of his résumé of recent investigations in southern Mesopotamia (*Mitt. d. k. k. geogr. Ges. in Wien*, vol. 56, 1913, pp. 3-8) Prince Sextus of Parma reports the fixing of the location of a large number of the historic places mentioned in Byzantine, Syrian, and Assyrian literature. Richest in remains of Christian culture is the old Christian city of Sergiopolis Resafa. This is a marked example of a Mesopotamian Christian city that has remained untouched by Mohammedan culture and architecture. The details of these investigations will soon be published. Associated with the Prince of Parma was Prof. Dr. Alois Musil, the well-known Arabologist.

57. *Monastery of Megaspelaeon.* In the *National Geographical Magazine* (vol. 24, pp. 310-323) for March, 1913, is an account of a visit by C. S. Alden to "Megaspelaeon, the Oldest Monastery in Greece," illustrated with photographs taken by the author. This monastery of the "Great Cave" is the oldest and richest in Greece,—the buildings date from 1640 and "the monks derive their income from extensive lands in the neighborhood and also from houses in Smyrna and Constantinople. About 140 monks dwell here and "they have a government like a republic and they elect their own abbot." The monastery is "like a relic of the Middle Ages," and Sir Thomas Wyse, in 1858, termed it "a great dormitory of religious commonplace." Of these monks, whose life is "a living death," we are told: "They send out no missionaries or preachers to the neglected

people; they go through their services with considerable indifference; they have no interest in study; they write no books, nor do they, like certain orders in the Roman Church, care for the sick and the poor." Their reputed wealth and the ruinous character of some of their buildings suggest an almost sacrilegious indifference. The smallness of their library contrasts with the "gigantic tuns of wine that would have been a credit to Heidelberg," with which their cellar is full. Famous throughout all Greece is the age-blackened painting at Megaspelaeon of the Virgin and Child, ascribed to St. Luke (by tradition painter as well as physician).

58. *Past and present.* In the course of his brief account of "Men of the Old Stone Age," in *The American Museum Journal* (vol. 12, 1912, pp. 279-288), Prof. H. F. Osborn (see the illustrations on p. 284, p. 285) speaks of the Dordogne group of caves, including Cro-Magnon, as "the birthplace of paleolithic history." Of the region about Les Eyzies he remarks: "Here human history is recorded in a continuous current for a period of 60,000 years, passing from the lower paleolithic of Le Monstier through all the barbaric and medieval stages to the hamlets of the peasant and the Châteaux of the French nobility."

The latest proof, according to Professor Obermaier, of "the religious or ceremonious significance of these caves in the minds of the paleolithic races," is found in the so-called "throne room" or "altar room" of the recently discovered cavern of La Pasiega. In the very recently discovered and already famous cavern of Tuc d'Audobert, "the first clay models of the paleolithic artists have been found, two statuettes of the bison, modeled in clay with the fingers." At the entrance of the cavern and grotto of Castello, near Puente Viesgo, is "the most complete continuous succession of cultures which has ever been found, dating from the middle of the older paleolithic or Acheulean to the beginning of the age of copper and bronze." It is interesting to learn that "this succession was selected as a type for a large model in the American Museum, which will be prepared through the kind coöperation of Professor Obermaier himself." The finest expression of paleolithic art, however, is "the frescoed ceiling of Altamira, more than 60 feet in length, with its splendid polychrome bison, horses, stags, and wild boar." A reproduction of two of these forms the frontispiece to this number of *The American Museum Journal*.

59. "*Praying-mantis*" in China. In his article on "The Praying Mantis in Chinese Folk-Lore," in *The Open Court* (vol. 27, 1913, pp. 57-60), Dr. B. Laufer cites several stories concerning this curious insect. According to Dr. Laufer, one of its names in Chinese is "the insect-killer," and "what we term the 'praying' attitude of the mantis . . . is nothing but this lying in ambush for other insects." The ancient Chinese seem to have been good observers of nature.

60. *Race-contact.* In an article on "Some Interesting Phases of the Contact of Races Individually and *En Masse*," published in *The Open Court* (vol. 27, 1913, pp. 25-38), Dr. A. F. Chamberlain treats of "pitfalls of language," sociological manifestations (scalping, use of tobacco, intoxicating drinks, observance of Sunday, use of soap, etc.), pedagogical difficulties (hair-cutting in Indian schools, mistakes of missionaries and teachers, etc.). Noteworthy are the attempts to teach temperance to certain African Negroes, and school-gardening to the New Zealand Maoris, and the reasons for non-success.
61. *Religion, etc., of Negroes of the West Indies and Guiana.* In the *Rev. d'Ethnogr. et de Sociol.* (vol. 3, 1912, pp. 234-237) M. Maurice Delafosse, of Paris, publishes a brief article, "De quelques persistances d'ordre ethnographique chez les descendants des nègres transportés aux Antilles et à la Guyane." By the relics of African religious ideas, practices, etc., surviving among the descendants of the Negroes transported from various regions of the Dark Continent, it is possible still to detect the particular locality from which each group came. The *voudou* practices,—the author interprets the name as signifying, in Dahomean, "in contact with hidden things," and other things in Haiti, where the Negroes no longer remember from what African country their ancestors came, indicate as such, for the majority, "Dahomey, or, at least, some part of the Slave Coast, inhabited for centuries by the peoples of the Ehwi family, who still inhabit it,—one of these peoples is the *fan* or Dahomean tribe." The close correspondence of cults is pointed out on page 235. The customs and practices of the *Boni*, *Yuka*, and other so-called "Bush-Negroes" (descendants of those who revolted against the Dutch and took refuge in the forests of the interior, where they still maintain an almost absolute state of independence both against Red Men and Europeans) of the Maroni in Dutch Guiana, as described by Crevaux in his *Voy. d. l'Amér. du Sud* (Paris, 1883), resemble strikingly those of the people, whom Delafosse terms Agni-Tchi or Agni-Assanti (i. e., the Fanti, Akwapim, Abbron, Ashanti, Zema, Agni, etc., of the Gold Coast to-day). Among these correspondences are the following: ordeal-drink, methods of salutation and dancing by women, animal-taboos, burial customs, navel-scarification of women, clay-daubing, wooden combs, pyramidal hair-dressing of women, cleanliness (*Boni*), form of huts, seclusion-house for women during menstruation, etc. The *maman-groom* "Mother Earth," is the *mo-assassi* of the Fanti. The names given children at birth (according to days of week) among the *Boni* of Guiana are practically the same, with a little phonetic variation here and there, as those of the Fanti of the Gold Coast. The trinity of *Gadou* (English *God*), his wife *Maria*, and his son *Jest-Kisti*, reveals Christian influence. But alongside this the old African cult of "Mother Earth,"—with temple, libations, etc.,—lives on.

62. *Religions in Bosnia-Herzegovina*. In the *Mitt. d. k. k. geogr. Ges. in Wien* (vol. 56, 1913, pp. 58-60) is a résumé of the data obtained through the census of October, 1910, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which contains some interesting facts concerning the distribution, etc., of religions in this part of Europe. The actual numbers of those professing different faiths was as follows:

Servian orthodox Christians.....	825,418
Musulmans (Sunnite Mohammedans)	612,137
Roman Catholics	434,061
Spaniolie Jews (native)	8,219
Greek United Catholics (Ruthenians).....	8,163
Evangelical Christians (Augsburg Confession)....	5,854
Other Jews	3,649
Evangelic Christians (Helvetian Confession).....	488
Other religions	63
No religion	19

Since 1895 all the religions have increased in adherents: Servian orthodox 22½%; Mohammedans 11½%; Roman Catholics 30%; Sephardic Jews 43½%; Other Jews 47%; Evangelical Christians 76½%; and the few Greek Catholics have multiplied themselves 43 times. This last great increase, as well as that of the Evangelical Christians is due mostly to immigration, and the small Mohammedan increase is accounted for largely by emigration (during the period 1895-1910 no fewer than 10,189 Mohammedans emigrated). The tendency against excessive polygamy noticeable all through Mohammedan lands, is marked in Bosnia-Herzegovina also, where, of 1,222 polygamous marriages among the Mohammedan population, the majority involved but two wives. In this region religion substitutes nationality. The Eastern orthodox Christians are Serbs; the Roman Catholics are Croats; the Mohammedans are Turks; the evangelical Christians are largely German; the Greek Catholics are Ruthenians. The mother-tongue of the great mass of the population is Serbo-Croatian, which the Croats write with the Roman, the Serbs with the Cyrillic alphabet. These statistics illustrate the complexities of the situation not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but in the rest of the Balkan peninsula as well.

63. *Siamese religious architecture*. In the *Zeitschrift f. Ethnologie* (vol. 44, 1912, pp. 693-806, 148 figs.) K. Döhring discusses at great length "Der Prächedibau in Siam," giving details of the origin, construction, etc., of the *prächedi*, or memorial-buildings, now a characteristic ornament of temple-sites in Siam. In the ruined old capital, Ayinthia, there were many fine *prächedis*. The two chief types are the round and the angular. The *prächedi* was developed from the *stūpa*.
64. "Telepatina." In *The Philosophic Path* (vol. 3, 1912, p. 432), the organ of the Theosophists of Point Loma (Cal.) is a note, based on "a remarkable communication from Colombia," appearing in

the South American Supplement of the London *Times* for August 27, 1912. A certain Dr. R. Z. Bayon "has just returned from that almost inaccessible forest jungle [Caquetà] with samples of a remarkable drug extracted from a climbing plant cultivated by the natives." The active principle of this plant, known as *Yagé*, "is anti-anemic and produced markedly beneficial effects in ameliorating and even curing the dread disease 'beri-beri.'" Under the influence of this drug, he reports of the natives that "They see hidden things, hear mysterious music, and, savages as they are, who have never left their native wilds, and, consequently, know nothing of what surrounds them, describe, in their peculiar fashion, cities, houses, white men in thousands, the pleasantness of the music they hear and everything that exists in the civilized world."

Moreover "One of his companions, Col. Morales, commandant of the district, persuaded Dr. Bayon to give him a few drops one night, and, in the morning, he described his experience, which has conveyed to him the knowledge of his father's death and his sister's severe illness. The nearest outpost of civilization was fifteen days' journey from them. A month later, the news was found to be true."

The active principle of this plant Dr. Bayon calls *telepatina*, and "careful scientific investigations are to be made of the samples brought back by him."